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ABSTRACT
Finance does not matter in perfect and efficient markets. Based on neoclassical economics,
financial capital is always perfectly priced, and all investments are completely valued in
frictionless markets.
In the real world, however, finance does matter, especially in the real estate market, which is
relatively imperfect and inefficient.
There are several phases through which funds flow into real estate. Among others, the interaction
between the financial market and real estate investors is crucial. The financial market provides
funds to investors. An efficient financial market will value real estate investments perfectly, but
an inefficient financial market will not. Thus, the cost and availability of capital for investors are
important factors that shape the real estate market of each country. The profile of real estate
investors is also important. Inefficient investors can misdirect funds, even if the financial market
is relatively perfect.
The primary objective of this paper is to unveil the inefficient relationship between the financial
market and real estate investors in Japan. This relationship is one of the reasons why land prices
and space markets boomed and then collapsed in the late 1980's and early 1990's. Later in the
paper, I will present an alternative model of the real estate market, and make several simulations
under the model.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Purpose
Japan has opened its closed door to the entire world three times in the last 200 years of
history. The first was in the late nineteenth century, when Japan was forced to sign treaties with
Western powers. These treaties endowed the Westerners one-sided economic advantages in
Japan. The second was after the loss of World War II, when Japan was incorporated into the
system of the capitalist economic world. The last was after the bubble economy, when Japan
was again forced to open its markets to the world, which had been described as closed by the
United States and other Western countries.
After World War II, Japan made tremendous efforts to catch up to other developed
nations, and actually reached its goals. Specifically, in the twenty years following World War II,
GNP increased by approximately 10% per year, more than twice the rate of increase of American
and Western European economies. However, since the bubble economy burst, the Japanese
economy has been in turmoil.
We cannot predict how many more times Japan will be forced to open its door in the
future, but the issue is that the Japanese markets have not been transparent. This tends to
produce and accumulate inefficiency in the economic system, which always requires great pain
and effort to adjust.
Emerging Trends in Real Estate 19991 made several statements regarding the Japanese
markets. "Japan has a terrifically inefficient market. It's hard for outsiders to really know
what's going on." It continued, "Japan has the second-largest world economy and a third-world
banking system."
Inefficiency in the financial and real estate markets seems to have triggered the bubble
Lend Lease Real Estate Investments and PricewaterhouseCoopers, 1998.
economy and its collapse. In order to avoid huge fluctuations in the economy in the future, and
to avoid great pain and effort to adjust the markets, we need to understand where inefficiency
exists, what it is, and how much we are paying for it. Some "inefficiency" costs may be
necessary within an economic and social framework of a nation. Nonetheless, we may need to
recognize how much we actually pay for these. Therefore, the primary purpose of this thesis is
to understand inefficiency and its costs to the Japanese financial and real estate markets by
examining the relationship between the financial market and real estate investors in Japan.
1.2 Organization of Document
I attempt to organize the thesis into two parts. The first part will be devoted to
understanding the actual behavior and operation of financial and real estate systems. In a sense,
I will take a positive approach in the first part of the thesis. In chapter two, I will present the
history of real estate ownership and show how certain underlying notions have influenced the
Japanese real estate market. Chapter three will be devoted to uncovering the financial and credit
systems, and to examining the close relationship between the financial and real estate markets.
In the later part of the thesis, I will try to evaluate the outcomes of the both markets, and
propose alternative models. Therefore, I will take a normative approach in the later part.
Chapter four will be devoted to addressing several factors necessary to establishing more efficient
markets. In chapter five, I will make three simulations under the alternative models.
2 Historical Understanding of Real Estate Ownership in Japan
Each country throughout the world has its own real estate ownership model. The real
estate ownership model has influenced real estate property markets, asset markets, and, in the end,
the entire economy of the country.
Japan's real estate ownership model is completely different from that of other countries.
The real estate ownership model has established a social and economic framework. To
understand how this came about, it is important to review the history of the real estate ownership
model in Japan.
2.1 History of Real Estate Ownership
2.1.1 The Meiji Era
Japan did not emerge from feudalism and establish a land ownership model until 1868,
during the so-called Meiji Reform'. Like other subjugated Asian nations, Meiji Japan was
forced to sign treaties with Western powers that left Japan at a disadvantage. These treaties
granted the Westerners one-sided economic and legal advantages in Japan. In order to regain
independence from the Europeans and Americans, and to establish itself as a respected nation in
the world, Meiji Japan was determined to close the gap between itself and Western powers
economically and militarily. Drastic reforms were carried out in practically all areas. For
1 The Shogunate surrendered its power to the Emperor and the Emperor subsequently restored orders by appointing a
government mainly run by mid to low level bureaucrats in the warrior class. Land ownership prior to the Meiji era
(i.e. the Edo era) is not clearly observed. There was a form of state ownership, nobility ownership, peasant
ownership, and communal ownership. While one person owned a parcel of land, a peasant (tenant) would most
likely occupy and cultivate the land. Peasants were tied to the land they were cultivating, and, as is the case in most
feudal societies, owning the land was one thing, and occupying and cultivating land was another. See Masayuki
Tagai, Unlocking Japan's Potential GDP, 2000, MIT Sloan Thesis.
instance, the new government aimed to make Japan a democratic state with equality among all
people. The boundaries between each social class of the Edo era were gradually broken down2.
In order to stabilize the new government, former lords had to return all their fiefdoms to the
emperor. Nevertheless, most of those lords became the new nobility and continued to be
allowed to hold large private real estate in their former fiefdoms and metropolitan areas. To
transform the agricultural economy of the Edo era into a developed industrial one, the
government directly supported the prospering of businesses and industries, especially the large
and powerful family businesses called zaibatsu 3. As a consequence, large land ownership by a
few landlords (chiefly the nobility and large merchants) was promoted during this period.
This concentrated land ownership was well recognized, specifically in metropolitan
areas. In the Tokyo metropolitan area at the beginning of the twentieth century, the number of
landowners who owned more than 10,000 tsubo4 (approximately 8.2 acres) was 108, 0.5% of the
total landowners at that time. However, this owned land accounted for almost 25% of the total
area. Of these 108, 39 were former lords in the Edo era (Tokugawa, Abe, Asano, Sakai, etc.),
40 were wealthy merchants from the Edo era (Mineshima, Watanabe, etc.) and political
merchants, the "zaibatsu". In particular, the Mitsubishi owned 231,792 tsubo (approximately
190 acres), and the Mitsui owned 170,258 tsubo (approximately 140 acres), ranked first and
second in terms of owned areas5.
2 There were mainly four social classes: warrior, farmer, craft worker, and merchant. Their activities and positions
were strictly regulated during the Edo era.
3 Zaibatsu were family-owned holding companies which played a major role in the Japanese economy from the late
1800s through World War II. These conglomerates expanded into almost all sectors, both industrial and financial,
with the four largest being Mitsubishi, Mitsui, Sumitomo, and Yasuda.
4 Japanese measurement of area. 1 tsubo equal to approximately 37 square feet.
5 Source: Shigetaka Kobayashi, Land Development and Urban Planning, 1981, Tokyo University Press.
In 1912, the number of landowners who owned more than 10,000 tsubo was 162, and
they owned approximately 30 percent of the total area in the old Tokyo city, indicating that
ownership concentration had been further promoted during this period. Merchants, particularly,
increased their ownership. This was due to the fact that those merchants also acted as
quasi-bankers at the same time, acquiring collateralized land from borrowers6 .
It is important to note that the concentrated real estate ownership by a small ruling class
had been the case throughout Japanese history. Other social classes, i.e. the peasant, small
merchant, and worker classes, were not permitted to own real estate, always renting tiny parcels
of real estate owned by a few large landlords. This situation gave rise to the excessive value of
land, which deviated from the land utilization value. Eventually, land became the most valuable
resource for people. The lending process, in which a pledge of land was required to obtain
financing, was also recognized from the Meiji era. These facts shaped the concept of real estate
and how banks lent money after this period.
2.1.2 After World War II
When the occupation forces arrived after the Second World War, one of their main tasks
was to rewrite the Japanese Constitution. History tells us that an initial draft proposed by the
Japanese government was rejected by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP),
headed by General MacArthur, because it made few changes in human rights, the power of the
emperor, or feudal ownership structures. In order to address these issues, SCAP redrafted
another version of the Constitution. The Japanese government under the occupation accepted
most of this draft except for Clause 29. The original clause stated that all land and national
6 Source: Ibid.
resources would become national property. This was a reflection of the SCAP's belief that
feudalism had been the cause of Japan's military aggression. The Japanese government reacted
by making a counter proposal that would leave the issue of land ownership open for gradual
transitional land reform. As a result, the land continued to remain in the hands of a small ruling
class, especially in urban areas7.
Furthermore, the dissolution of the zaibatsu groups did not completely eliminate large
land ownership by large merchants. Although the SCAP divided each zaibatsu group into
several companies depending on the nature of their businesses, almost all real estate the zaibatsu
groups had owned was transferred to the real estate companies of the groups. For instance, real
estate the Mitsubishi had owned was divided and transferred to two different real estate firms,
Kanto and Yowa; however, when Kanto and Yowa merged, the assets returned to the Mitsubishi
Estate Co., Ltd.
On the other hand, large land ownership by the former lords and the nobility was
basically eliminated because of huge property taxes, which forced sell-offs. Ironically, this
further encouraged concentrated real estate ownership in the hands of large firms, since the
nobility's assets were primarily located in metropolitan areas, too expensive for individuals or
small firms to acquire.
2.1.3 From the High Economic Growth Period8 to Present
Land utilization during this period is characterized by heavy industrialization,
urbanization, and, consequently, the concentration of production and business facilities in a few
7 Masayuki Tagai, Unlocking Japan's Potential GDP, 2000, MIT Sloan Thesis.
8 The period after World War II to the first oil crisis (around 1973). As will be discussed later, Japan recorded
tremendous economic growth during this period.
large metropolitan areas. This further encouraged land ownership by large corporations.
Matsubara (1988) explained this increase by categorizing corporations into four groups .
The first group included real estate developers (Mitsubishi Estate, Tokyu Land), construction
companies (Obayashi, Kajima, Fujita), and private railroad companies (Keisei Electric Railway,
Nagoya Railroad), the companies increasing land acquisition mainly for residential development
purposes. The second group consisted of the automobile industry (Toyota Motor, Nissan Motor,
Honda Motor), the iron and steel industry (Kobe Steel, NKK), and the machinery industry
(Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Kawasaki Heavy Industries), the industries that increased land
acquisition so as to expand production facilities to meet demand for their products. The third
group was composed of the companies that increased land ownership by the mid 70s, but
decreased it after the first oil crisis (1973-1975). This group included the petroleum and
chemical industries. The last group, represented by the textile industry, decreased land
ownership throughout the 1970s.
Table 2-1 shows how each economic sector (household, government, financial
institution, and private firm other than financial institution) invested in land during the high
economic growth period. Figure 2-1 uses the same data, but it covers a longer period of time,
from 1955 to 1998. Firms have continuously invested in land especially during the high
economic growth period (table 2-1). Shortly after the first oil crisis, however, they sold off land
assets for two years (figure 2-1). This trend was consistent with the argument by Matsumoto;
that is, companies, especially in the petroleum and chemical industries, sold off their assets to
restructure their balance sheets and smooth their profits shortly after the first oil crisis.
9 Source: Hiroshi Matsubara, Fudousan Shihon to Toshi Kaihatsu, 1988, Minerva Shobo.
Table 2- 1 Land Investment in Each Sector during the High Economic Growth Period
Sector / Year 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962
Household (62) (96) (90) (118) (183) (274) (363) (450)
Firm (non-financial) 42 72 58 82 144 231 278 324
Financial Institution 4 5 6 8 13 16 15 22
Government 16 20 26 28 26 27 70 105
1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972
(536) (673) (672) (844) (1137) (1181) (1948) (1883) (3417) (5638)
398 487 486 567 827 780 1498 1316 2677 4705
37 47 64 55 54 75 106 106 92 88
101 139 122 223 256 326 344 461 647 844
Note: Thousand Million Yen. Market Value at each year. Calculated by the author.
Source: Economic Planning Agency, Annual Report on National Accounts, 2000, MOF Printing Bureau
Figure 2- 1 Land Investment in Each Sector (Long Time Series: 1955 - 1998)
Note: Thousand Million Yen. Calculated by the author
Source: The Economic Planning Agency, Annual Report on National Accounts, 2000
Notice, however, that the Japanese government also increased land investment,
specifically after the first oil crisis (figure 2-1). In order to look at these trends in more detail,
figure 2-2 shows the share of land ownership from the stock viewpoint. Unlike in the previous
table and figure, in this figure I have excluded the percent held by individual households in order
to carefully examine those of other sectors. Please also note that data are calculated by market
value in the previous table and figure, but by the book value in figure 2-2.
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Note: Calculated by the author
Source: Economic Planning Agency, Annual Report on National Accounts, 2000
Unfortunately, I cannot obtain data prior to 1969, but it is realistic to assume that the
percent of land owned by corporations increased until the first oil crisis. After then, however,
figure 2-2 indicates that government had increased land acquisition until the bubble economy,
and increased again after the burst of the bubble economy. I will discuss these phenomena in
more detail in the later section.
In summary, land ownership after the Meiji reform is characterized as a history of
concentrated ownership by corporations, which continued steadily from the end of the nineteenth
century to the burst of the bubble economy, despite some corporate sell-offs after the first oil
crisis. In contrast, the Japanese government increased its acquisition of land after the first oil
crisis and the burst of the bubble economy. One might ask why this was the case. Did all
firms increase their investment in land solely for pure business purposes? Why did the
government increase its acquisition when firms decreased theirs? In the next section, I will look
for answers to these questions.
2.2 Reasons for Direct Real Estate Investment by Private Firms
In the previous section, I discussed that corporations steadily increased their investments
in land after World War II except for periods after the first oil crisis and the bust of the bubble
economy. In contrast, the Japanese government increased land acquisition after the first oil
crisis and the burst of the bubble economy. The primary objective of this section is to examine
the reasons why corporations needed to increase their land assets. I will discuss the function of
the government's investment in another chapter.
2.2.1 Needs for Production and Service Facilities by Private Firms
Table 2-2 shows how major heavy industrial companies directly own business and
production facilities. I selected six companies that represent Japanese heavy industrial firms:
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Hitachi, Toyota Motor, Nissan Motor, Matsushita Electric Industrial
(Panasonic), and Toshiba.
Table 2- 2 Percentage of Owned Real Estate
Company Name Facility Category Owned Area Rented Area Percentage
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Production Facilities 10,141 1,113 90.1%
Fringe Benefit Facilities 1,315 27 98.0%
Offices 224 46 83.0%
Other 1,330 14 99.0%
Total 13,010 1,200 91.6%
Hitachi Production Facilities 3,913 - -
Fringe Benefit Facilities 813 - -
Offices 488 - -
Other 292 - -
Total 5,506 897 86.0%
Toyota Motor Production Facilities 5,551 0 100.0%
Fringe Benefit Facilities 172 0 100.0%
Offices 1,068 6 99.4%
Other 1,064 71 93.7%
Total 7,855 77 99.0%
Nissan Motor Production Facilities 4,818 0 100.0%
Fringe Benefit Facilities - 315 -
Offices 1,478 51 96.7%
Other 1,455 2 99.9%
Total 7,751 368 95.5%
Matsushita Production Facilities 1,594 0 100.0%
Fringe Benefit Facilities 155 85 64.6%
Offices 195 78 71.4%
Other 531 0 100.0%
Total 2,475 163 93.8%
Toshiba Production Facilities 1,938 - -
Fringe Benefit Facilities 934 - -
Offices 1,423 87 94.2%
Other 209 - -
Total 4,504 766 85.5%
Source: Financial Report of 1998 Fiscal Yearl of each company.
Note: All numbers except percentages are expressed by thousand square meters.
1) Owned Area: Floor area owned by each company.
2) Rented Area: Floor area rented by each company.
3) Percentage: Owned Area / (Owned Area + Rented Area)
4) Production Facility: Factory, Warehouse, etc.
5) Fringe Benefit Facility: Employee Housing and Accommodation Facility for employee in resort areas, etc.
6) Office: Head Office and Branches
7) Other: Mostly composed of Laboratories, etc.
It is not surprising that these industrial firms own relatively large production facilities,
since factories or warehouses typically require buildings specifically designed for manufacture
and storage of their products. Office buildings, on the other hand, need not be as customized for
each tenant. However, data tell us that these firms that continuingly invested in land assets
throughout the high economic growth period acquired land not only for production expansion,
but also for individual office needs and fringe benefit usage.
One may point out that Matsushita Electric Industrial rents more office floors than other
firms, and that this might also be the case with other companies not listed in the table. It is true
that relatively newly established companies, like Matsushita, do not own as many real estate
assets as those companies originating from the zaibatsu group companies, but we should not
ignore the fact that most large companies typically hold real estate subsidiaries that own and
manage office buildings, and lease them to parent companies and other companies in the same
group. For instance, Matsushita Kousan is a real estate subsidiary in the Matsushita group,
which owns magnificent twin office buildings in the Osaka metropolitan area. One building is
leased to companies outside the Matsushita group, but another is fully occupied by the Matsushita
10 A fiscal year for most Japanese firms begins on April 1st and end on March 31st.
and its group companies.
In order to look at this trend more clearly, I will next examine financial institutions,
whose business facilities require primarily office spaces. I selected four major commercial
banks: Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi, Sumitomo Bank, Sakura Bank, and Fuji Bank.
Table 2- 3 Percentage of Owned Real Estate in the Commercial Bank Industry
Company Name Facility Category Owned Area Rented Area Percentage
Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi Offices and Branches 790 299 72.5%
Fringe Benefit Facilities 322 31 91.2%
Sumitomo Bank Offices and Branches 508 205 71.2%
Fringe Benefit Facilities 285 61 82.4%
Sakura Bank Offices and Branches 672 449 59.9%
Fringe Benefit Facilities 30 2 93.8%
Fuji Bank Offices and Branches 564 253 69.0%
Fringe Benefit Facilities 283 170 62.5%
Source: Financial Report of 1998 Fiscal Year of each company.
Note: All numbers are expressed by square meter except percentage.
1) Owned Area: Floor areas owned by each company.
2) Rented Area: Floor areas each company rents.
3) Percentage: Owned Area / (Owned Area + Rented Area)
In preparing this table, I referred to financial reports of these banks as of the 1998 fiscal
year. Table 2-3 shows the result. As can be seen in this table, these commercial banks also
own a relatively high percentage of office space. Financial institutions such as these
nation-wide commercial banks need optimal locations for branches so that they can attract a
variety of customers, ranging from residents to shoppers to firms near the branches. Optimal
locations for financial institutions are likely to change from time to time as surrounding areas
develop. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that renting would be more advantageous to these
financial institutions than owning their own office space, given that renting allows them to
relocate or, in some cases, completely eliminate their branches. However, the Japanese
commercial banks listed above own not only their head offices but also their branch offices
throughout Japan.
As will be discussed later, demand for goods and services was basically bullish
throughout the high economic growth period. As a consequence, Japanese private firms needed
to expand their operation facilities to meet the needs. This fact, together with the absence of
real estate investors with enough funds, partly accounts for why these private firms acquired land
directly and built business facilities on their own.
2.2.2 Tax Shelter Value of Land
As is sometimes observed throughout the world, the tax system of a country can
influence the behavior of households and firms in selecting optimal asset allocations. This is
certainly the case in Japan. Until recently, the Japanese tax system made real estate a favorable
asset with which to accumulate wealth, especially for individuals. It has been pointed out that
for individuals, land has been a very good tax shelter. Inequities in the inheritance and capital
gain tax systems have often been suggested as probable culprits in the overvaluing of land.
Since land is undervalued in the inheritance tax base, individuals can lessen their tax burden by
holding their assets in the form of land", thus driving up land prices. However, this tax shelter
incentive works only for individuals, not for corporations, since there is no inheritance tax for the
latter.
2.2.3 Did Firms Acquire Land for Business Purposes?
What factors other than those mentioned above motivated private firms to invest directly
" Nishimura, Yamazaki, Idee, and Watanabe, "Distortionary Taxation, Excessive Price Sensitivity, and Japanese
Land Prices", 1999, NBER Working Paper No. 7254.
and own real estate assets? Did they really hold land only for business/operation purposes, as
discussed in the sections 2.2.1?
Figure 2-3 shows the result of research done by the National Land Agency on firms'
prospective schedule to use their land. An astonishingly high percentage of the companies have
no plan to utilize their land. Furthermore, apart from the period during the bubble economy, the
percentage has been steadily increasing. Unfortunately, I was not able to obtain data prior to
1973. It would be safe to assume, however, that most firms acquired land for immediate
business purposes throughout the high economic growth period. After the first oil crisis around
1973, however, they seem to have increased their acquisition of land without having a plan for its
immediate use.
Figure 2- 3 Prospective Building Schedule of Unutilized Land
Source: National Land Agency, Tochi Hakusho, Time series are expressed by fiscal year.
Therefore, it appears that those firms invested in real estate not only for business purposes, but
also for purposes other than immediate business use. We might also be able to say that land
utilization is implemented when other factors, such as enough funds to finance construction,
come into play.
2.2.4 The Land Myth and Price Determination
Figure 2-4 describes the movement of land price index of three zoning areas (commercial,
industrial, and residential area) from 1955 to 1999 semiannually.
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Source: Japan Real Estate Institute, each index is the average of land price indices of the six largest cities (Tokyo,
Yokohama, Nagoya, Osaka, Kyoto, and Kobe). The Price of March, 1991 = 100
As depicted in Figure 2-4, Japan has experienced turbulent behavior in land prices since
World War II. Between 1955 and 1990, the residential land price in metropolitan areas (six
largest cities) soared to more than two hundred times its 1955 value, whereas stock prices rose to
ninety times their 1955 value. Since the consumer price index increased eight fold during the
same period, the real value of land increased tremendously. Underlying this spectacular
increase in the land price until 1990 was the so-called Tochi Shinwa (the land myth), i.e. the belief
that land was an ultimate safe harbor, always beating any other assets with ever-increasing prices.
It is remarkable to note that except for one year (1975), between 1955 and 1990 land prices did
not fall. The myth was firmly entrenched in the post-war Japanese economic history. Overall,
this land myth is the critical reason why firms tried to hold real estate on their own.
Keeping this fact in our mind, let us discuss briefly how land price is determined in
Japan. In the United States, the land price determination model that we frequently encounter
would be as follows:
Po =PV(Ri + R2 + - - .. . . + Rti + Rt) + PV(Pt) (1)
where Pn denotes the land price at a particular period n, Rn denotes the rent earned from the land
at a particular period n. When we apply the growing perpetuity formula to Pt, the above
formula will be modified as follows:
Po=PV(Rj + R2 + - - . . . . + Rt-i + Rt) + Rti / i-g (2)
where i denotes the capitalization rate, and g denotes the growth rate of rent after (t+1) period.
In this model, we assume that cash inflow, usually represented by rent, is the basis of
determining land prices. In Japan, on the other hand, we could not modify equation (1) to (2)
because Pt is not derived from expected rent levels. As will be discussed later, land price is not
based on rents, but rather on people's expectation for future sales price of land. Therefore, we
can define our land price determination model as follows:
Po=PV(Ri + R2 +. . . . . . + Rt-i + R) + PV(Pt) (3)
where Pet denotes the expected land price at the time t, and it is priced basing on other factors
than the prevailing rent at the time of t.
However, equation (3) is not yet enough to explain the Japanese land price model.
Nishimura et. al. (1999: see footnote 10) suggested that we should consider an augmented PV
model incorporating quasi-rents (tax shelter values) mentioned in the previous section. Instead
of simple PV model (3), we then get
Po =PV(Ri + R2 +. . . . . . . + Rt-i + Rt) + PV(P't) + [PVQR]t (4)
where [PVQRJt denotes the present value of future quasi-rents.
2.2.5 Implication of Collateral Value
The above quasi-rents PV model can be applied to the firms' asking prices. In section
2.2.2, I discussed that the tax shelter incentive was not a decisive factor in firms holding real
estate. However, as discussed earlier, land was considered as the most desirable collateral by
banks. Thus, owning land made borrowing easy, even in difficult periods for corporations
(Nishimura, 1996). This collateral service value should also be included in the quasi-rents.
In this chapter, I have discussed probable reasons for government and private industry to
incorporate land assets in their balance sheets. Land in Japan had long been seen as the safest
asset, guaranteeing ever-increasing prices. In addition, during the period of high economic
growth, land acquisition was supported by firms whose primary objective was to extend their
operation facilities so as to meet rising needs. The existence of quasi-rents, tax shelter value for
individuals, and collateral service value for corporations also had implications for land price
movements. However, these factors do not completely explain the land price movements after
World War II or the building boom during the oil crisis and the bubble economy. To understand
these movements better, we must consider the financial condition at the time.
3 Importance of Finance in the Real Estate Market
Finance does not matter in efficient and frictionless markets. When resources are
allocated in frictionless markets and the existence of a medium of exchange is taken for granted,
good investments will always be financed and bad investments will not. The cost of capital
each investor can obtain is correctly priced depending on the characteristics of investment.
Furthermore, based on the famous Modligliani-Miller Theorem (M&M), debt and equity do not
matter to finance investment. Thus, investors need not worry about where the money comes
from.
However, in the real world, finance does matter, especially in the real estate market,
which is not perfect and efficient. Sometimes good investments are not financed, and other
times the financial market provides investors with too low costs of capital relative to the risk.
Moreover, the financial market provides funds without judging the risk-return characteristics of
investments.
These imperfections suggest that finance and investment interact in important ways. In
other words, neoclassical economic assumptions and hence the M&M do not hold perfectly in the
real world, thus enhancing the role of finance in economic performance'.
The primary objective of this chapter is to understand how finance has influenced the
movement of the Japanese real estate market.
3.1 Finance Has Influenced the Japanese Real Estate Market
3.1.1 Overview of Japanese Economic History
Before discussing the influence of finance conditions on the real estate market, we must
Timothy Riddiough, Real Estate Finance (Lecture Note), 1999, MIT.
review the history of the Japanese economy. Figure 3-1 describes the GNP rate of increase from
1970 through 1999.
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Note: Shaded areas indicate major economic expansions and depressions.
We called the period from World War II through 1972 the high economic growth period,
during which GNP increased by approximately 10% per year, an astonishing rate of increase
throughout the world at that time. However, the first oil crisis hit a Japan that was almost
completely dependent on oil imports from OPEC countries. The GNP increase rate went down
to less than 0% from 1973 to 1974 (shaded area).
The second oil crisis occurred in 1979 (shaded area from 1979 to 1980), and in 1985 the
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Plaza Accord took place, in which the finance ministers of the Group 5 met at the Plaza Hotel in
New York to mount a concerted effort to reduce the value of the U.S. dollar against other major
currencies. After the Plaza Accord, the sudden appreciation of yen had a great impact on the
Japanese economy, especially in those sectors that relied on export sales. We experienced a
tremendous boom (the bubble economy: shaded area from 1989 to 1991), followed by its bust
soon after.
What are the important factors to support a country's economic growth? First, it is
frequently quoted that the magnitude of national savings and its efficient flow into capital
investments is a key factor in a nation's economic growth. Many economists have pointed out
that the high economic growth in Japan was due to the higher saving rate of the Japanese, and the
continuing expansion of capital expenditure by private firms. In this sense, finance, or capital,
is significant in making a first step of economic growth. Second, an increase in labor power is
as important as that in capital. The final factor of a nation's economic growth is technological
innovation2. Nakatani (1999) applied this model, developed by R. M. Solow, to the Japanese
economy and analyzed each factor's contribution to the overall economic growth (Table 3-1)3.
Throughout the period, the capital factor contributed most to the Japanese economic growth.
Table 3- 1 Contribution of each factor to overall economic growth
Category / Period 1965-1972 1973-1980 1981-1990
Capital 5.19% 2.73% 1.79%
Lbr 0.33% 0.25% 0.66%
TechnologyV 3.49% 0.90% 1.35%
Overall 9.01% 3.88% 3.80%
2 R.M. Solow, A contribution to the Theory of Economic Growth, 1956, Quarterly Journal of Economics.
3 Iwao Nakatani, Macroeconomics, 1999, Nihon Hyoron-Sha.
According to Tanaka (1997)4, "The only binding factor for the Japanese economy soon
after World War II was a finance constraint. Government and private industry had an ideal
future model (the Western Europe and American economies) in their mind. Thus, the most
important issue had been how fast they would be able to catch up with those countries." This
implies a critical reason why capital contribution is essential for the growth of the Japanese
economy.
Table 3-1 shows that technological growth had accounted for about 40% of the overall
economic growth until the first oil crisis, but only 23% during the second period. Following
Tanaka's observation that the primary objective of Japan after World War II was to catch up with
other developed countries in terms of production, this decline indicates that by 1980, Japan had
almost reached its goal. Therefore, I conjecture that Japanese firms lost their primary objectives
and no longer had a focus for investing funds. It is important now to consider where these funds
were invested.
3.1.2 Need for Stabilized Finance and Credit System
Both government and management of private industry had one goal in mind: to catch up
with the economies of Western Europe and the United States. As a consequence, they
established an economic infrastructure most suitable to reach their objective. First, industry set
up an amicable relationship with labor unions. They came up with lifetime employment system,
which promised lifetime employment in exchange for a promise not to demand a salary increase
and not to strike. The government also established regulations to protect Japanese companies
from outside penetration in order for firms to concentrate on their operations.
4 Naoki Tanaka, Japanese Economy after the Big-Bang, 1997, Nikkei Shinbun-sha.
Tanaka also argued that after World War II management felt confident that long and
medium-term demand increase in all sectors would be promising. Therefore, the sole risk factor
for management, as well as for government, was how to obtain financing during cyclical
depressions.
Keiretsu, or the main-bank system, is one means by which large firms can overcome
depressions with respect to finance. A Keiretsu is a network of companies, usually organized
around a major bank. There are long-standing business relationships between the group
companies. Most debt financing comes from the keiretsu banks or from elsewhere in the group.
This system confers certain financial advantages for keiretsu group firms, especially during
depressions. There is a term frequently used by economists: asymmetric information. It
indicates that managers know more about their companies' prospects, risks, and values than do
outside investors. Because of the asymmetry, investments are not always perfectly priced by the
financial market. The long-standing business relationship between the keiretsu group firms and
the main bank, however, mitigated this information problem, since the bank know about the
group firms more than outside investors. Thus, a company with capital budgets exceeding
operation cash flows can turn to the main bank or other keiretsu companies for financing. This
avoids the cost or possible bad-news signal of a public sale of securities5 . The most widely
known empirical evidence is the q-based equation estimated in Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein
(1991)6. They argue that the close bank relationship enjoyed by keiretsu group firms is likely to
diminish the information problem.
In addition to the keiretsu system, however, I will discuss another system that could
5 Source: R. A Brealey and S. C Myers, Principles of Corporate Finance, 1996, McGraw-Hill.
6 Source: Hoshi, A. Kashyap, and D. Scharfstein, Corporate Structure, Liquidity, and Investment Evidence from
Japanese Industrial Groups, Quarterly Journal of Economics 106.
stabilize the finance and credit system even during depressions, established by private industry in
conjunction with government.
Diamond (1997) argued that as public financial market participation increases, the market
becomes more efficient, and the banking sector shrinks. After World War II, maybe even now,
the Japanese public financial market has been far from efficient. For instance, as will be
discussed later, mutual stock sharing system by large firms prevented the stock market from
being efficient. Conservative individual investors like salaried employee had not put their
money into the stock market. This factor, together with the high saving rate, established the
system to provide firms with huge funds from large commercial banks in which most of people's
savings were deposited. This financial system had worked for long time after World War II.
Even though the savings rate was high in Japan, finance demand was strong, especially
during the high economic growth period. It is reasonable to assume that credit rationing (i.e.,
the demand for credit exceeds supply at the prevailing interest rate) occurred even in keiretsu
groups.






Even if a partial equilibrium framework is adopted, the usual graphical analysis of
supply and demand does not work in the context of the credit market. Figure 3-2 shows this
point. If the demand schedule is L1, a competitive equilibrium exists, and interest rate R1 clears
the market. On the other hand, when the demand is strong (L2), the supply and demand curves
do not intersect because the supply schedule is backward bending (S). When the demand is
strong, banks must rank those borrowers. If banks select borrowers only by interest rates they
can charge, they might lend funds only to the borrowers whose businesses are risky. Thus,
ranking borrowers by interest rates can be inconsistent with their interests, and the credit supply
schedule may be backward bending for high level of the interest rate. Since demand and supply
curves do not intersect, a new system for ranking potential borrowers need to be devised in order
to reach equilibrium 7. Bester (1985, 1987) shows that no credit rationing will occur when
collateral is used in order to select the different types of borrowers. Eventually, land collateral
as a sorting device took root in the Japanese economy.
This credit system worked very well when the land price movements mentioned in the
section 2.2.4 were taken into account. By the first oil crisis in 1972, the Japanese economy
experienced six major fluctuations, including the "Nabezoko" depression from 1956 to 1957, and
the "Shouken" depression from 1964 to 1965. Land prices, however, continued to increase even
during periods of depression. As a result, private firms continued to be able to borrow, since
banks based loan on land collateral.
We must now look at the role of government in finance at that time. The coalition of
government and financial institutions, frequently referred to as the "Gosou-Sendan" system
meaning a convoy of large banks led and protected by the Ministry of Finance, prevailed from the
7 Xavier Freixas and Jean-Charles Rochet, Microeconomic of Banking, 1997, MIT Press.
end of World War II until recently. The financial industry has historically been highly regulated,
and the barrier to entry into the industry is a quite large. It is my view that the governmental has
been concerned not only with regulating the financial industry, but also with maintaining a credit
system based on land collateral.
Figure 3-3 shows the negative correlation between land prices and government's land
investments. The methodology I use in this analysis is as follows. I use the average all zoning
area (commercial, industrial, and residential areas) land price index in six major cities as a source
of land prices provided by the Japan Real Estate Institute. Both change rates are calculated as:
Change in Land Price = (P1 + P9 ,) / (P-i + Pt-1) - 1
Change in Government Investment = [G1/ (P 1 + Pt)] / [Gt-i / (Pt-1 + P91 i)] -1
P3, and P", denote land price on March in year t, and that on September in year t respectively
(meaning that the data are tabulated semiannually). Gt denotes government investment in year t.
This figure clearly indicates that government expenditure to acquire land increased when
the rate of increase of land price decreased. On the other hand, when land prices soared,
government expenditure decreased.
There are several ways to interpret this trend. The first simple assumption is because
government had fixed budgets each year for acquiring land, when land prices dropped, the
government increased their acquisition. Nonetheless, the figure seems to imply more than this
simple assumption. The second supposition is that the government increased land investments
in order to help banks liquidate collaterized real estate assets for which bad loans were made.
Figure 3- 3 Negative Correlation between Land Price and Government Investments in Land
Note: Calculated by the author
Source: Japan Real Estate Institute, Land Price Index, 2000
Economic Planning Agency, Annual Report on National Accounts, 2000
This is what exactly happened after the bubble economy burst. The final assumption is that the
government increased land acquisition in order to prevent further decrease in land price and to
stabilize the credit system based on land collateral. The later assumption implies a more
aggressive participation by government.
As I mentioned, Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein argue that the close bank relationship
enjoyed by keiretsu group firms is likely to mitigate the asymmetric information problem. It is
also assumed that land collateral can mitigate the asymmetric information problem in the sense
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This finance and credit system worked well at least by the end of the high economic
growth period because relatively lower costs of capital flowed into companies with the greatest
growth opportunities. The continuation of the system, however, has misdirected valuable
financial resources (i.e. funds flowed into firms with fewer growth opportunities but with good
land collateral), resulting in speculative inflow of funds into the stock and real estate markets.
In this sense, finance and investment interact in important ways, and inefficient financial market
sometimes creates booms and busts in the real estate market.
3.2 Finance Matters in the Land Price Determination
3.2.1 Land Price Determination
I argued in sections 2.2.4 and 2.2.5 that a modified present value model including the
expected land value and quasi-rent value would better explain the land price movements in Japan:
Po=PV(Ri + R2 +. . . . . . . + Rt-i + Rt) + PV(Pt) + [PVQR]t (1)8
However, I will exclude the rent factor from the equation. As will be discussed later,
the tenant's right to occupy space is highly protected by the tenancy law. Once a tenant
occupies space, it is difficult for a landlord to raise rent or evict the tenant. In the extreme case,
the landlord has to pay back all rents obtained from the tenant. In this sense, the present value
of rent accounts for a tiny portion of the total value of land. Therefore, I will exclude the
present value of rents from equation (1) so as to better capture the movement in the Japanese
market.
Po= PV(Pet) + [PVQR]t (2)
8 Please refer to the section 2.2.4 in detail.
In next section, I will present a land price determination model based on equation (2)
and following assumptions. First, as discussed earlier, private firms played a crucial role in the
real estate market. Thus, I will assume that at any given time corporate investors determine land
prices. Second, since measuring investors' expectation of future prices is a difficult task, I will
also assume that the movements of GDP decide the direction of investors' expectation, and that
the amount of funds available to investors decide the magnitude of investor's expectation. In
other word, I will assume that at any given time investors' expectation of future prices always
exceeds the amount of funds available to corporate investors. In this sense, the total amount of
funds currently available to private firms is an important determinant of land prices. I will
construct a land price determination model based on the assumptions, and try to prove the
validity of the model.
3.2.2 Land Price Regression Analysis
(1) Model Specification
I will specify my model to describe how land prices were determined. As discussed
earlier, the model is such that the total amount of funds currently available to private firms is an
important determinant of land price. Therefore, I will include independent variables that
represent financial conditions, as well as a demand factor for land:
Pt =f(C, V, L, I, D) (a)
where Pt is land price at time t, C is excess cash amount available to firms, V is aggregate firms'
value, L is average debt to equity ratio, I is interest rate, and D is demand for land.
I assume that the first four variables stand for financial conditions for the private firms.
Excess cash amount means the amount of funds that private firms have in the form of cash,
short-term bank deposits, and other short-term marketable securities. I assume that the amount
of debt available for a private firm is determined by a function of the firm's value and its
debt-to-equity ratio. In theory, the firm tries to maintain its optimal capital structure determined
by its business risk and economic environment surrounding the firm. Thus, the function of the
current firm value (market stock price) and its debt-to-equity ratio (capital structure given the
market stock price and the level of debt financing) can represent the amount of debt that the firm
can employ at a particular time. I also include the interest rate as one of the financial variables.
Lastly, we should decide what kind of variables characterizes the demand for land.
In the land market, demand comes from the buyers, firms or households. For firms,
demand for land will be decided by a function of their output levels and relative price of land.
For households, demand for land will depend on income and relative land prices. For a given
level of the supply of land, land prices will increase when firms' output levels and household
incomes increase. Thus, it is safe to assume that demand for land will increase and decrease as
the economy expands and contracts. This economic change will be approximated by nominal
GDP. Then, the model is specified as follows:
Pt = ao+aiC+a2V+a 3L+adI+asD+ (b)
Following predictions as to the signs of coefficients can be made. First, land prices
will be positively correlated to excess cash amount in the sense that firms can increase real estate
investments when the amount of cash increases. Second, land prices will be also positively
correlated to a firm's value, since an increase in the firm's value will increase the firm's ability to
employ more debt. On the other hand, land prices will be negatively correlated to debt-to-equity
ratio. The financial market will be reluctant to provide funds to the firm when its debt-to-equity
ratio exceeds the optimal capital structure. It is difficult to predict the sign of the coefficient of
the interest rate. In the United States, it would be assumed that asset prices are negatively
correlated to the level of interest rates. However, this might not be the case in the Japanese
markets. Basically, asset prices estimated by the discount cash flow method are considered to
be more sensitive to interest rate fluctuations, but Japanese firms had not used the discount cash
flow method until the burst of the bubble economy9 . Moreover, before the burst of the bubble
economy investors believed that land prices could increase at a higher rate than interest rates.
Lastly, there might be no doubt that land prices will be positively correlated to the demand
variable.
(2) Data Description
Although land prices in general are heterogeneous and behave differently, an aggregate
land price index will be used to keep the macroeconomic analysis as simple as possible. The
model examines prices on a quarterly basis, from 1971/1st to 1999/1st. Data used for each
variable are as follows.
Land Price (P)
I use the average urban land price index (including commercial, residential, and
industrial zones) of the six major metropolitan areas (Tokyo, Yokohama, Osaka, Nagoya, Kyoto,
and Kobe), tabulated semi-annually (March and September), issued by the Japan Real Estate
Institute. I apply a linear adjustment so that semi-annual data can be converted into quarterly
data. I define the data in March and September of a year as land prices of the first and third
quarters of the year, respectively. The land price of the second quarter is the average price of
the first and third quarter. The price of the fourth quarter is the average price of the third quarter
of the year and the first quarter of the next year.
Excess Cash for Firms (C)
As a variable of excess cash for private firms, I use the all industry liquidity ratio index,
9 The Pay Back Period method had been popular in doing pro forma analysis in Japan. After the bubble economy
burst, the discount cash flow method began to be used. This change in pro forma analysis might have affected the
asset price determination after the burst of the bubble economy.
tabulated quarterly (March, June, September, and December), provided by the Bank of Japan.
The index is calculated as follows:
Total Balance of Cash, Deposits, and Marketable Securities / Total Sales of Preceding Year
This index appears in the Ratio Related to Corporate Finance section of Short-Term Economic
Survey of Principal Enterprises.
Firm Value (V)
The TOPIX, the value-weighted index of the first section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange,
will be used as a variable representing aggregate market values of private firms. The
observations are taken from the last trading days of March, June, September, and December in
order to match the frequency of other variables.
Debt to Equity Ratio (D)
I calculate the debt-to-equity ratio based on the closing balance-sheet account of
non-financial incorporated enterprises appearing on the Annual Report on National Accounts by
the Economic Planning Agency. Since the data is the end-of-calendar year data, I extrapolate
linearly so that quarterly data can be obtained. The square power of the debt-to-equity ratio at
each quarter will be used in the model.
Interest Rate (I)
I use as a risk-free interest rate a 10-year government bond yearly yield with the longest
remaining maturity, tabulated quarterly. The data appears in the Economic and Financial Data
issued by the Bank of Japan.
Demand for Land (D)
As an index of demand for land, I use nominal GDP obtained from the Annual Report on
National Accounts provided by the Economic Planning Agency.
(3) Re-specification of the Model
The land price index is computed based on appraisal. Appraisers typically refer to
historical trends in determining current land prices, which tends to create lags behind actual
market prices. Therefore, I include not only current values but also lagged values of all
independent variables.
I continue to include lagged values until the last addition improves the adjusted-R2, with
the maximum lag of a year (four quarters). Once the highest adjusted-R 2 is reached, each
variable is examined whether it improves the adjusted-R 2. A variable is removed if the removal
improves the adjusted-R2. As a result, the final model can be specified as follows:
Pt = ao+a C+a2V +as a3 +a4E+as2D+c (c)
where 2denotes the sum of the current and lagged values explained above.
(4) Results
Table 3-2 shows the result of the regression analysis. I start by examining x, excess
cash amount for private firms.
As I predicted earlier, the sign of the estimated parameter is positive, and the result is
statistically significant. Thus, investment by private firms is more or less triggered by the cash
and cash equivalent on hand.
The sign of the estimated parameter of firm value is positive as predicted. This result
shows us that when a firm's value increases, the firm is more likely to borrow money and invest
in land. There is a constraint, however, as to the maximum amount of debt the firm can employ.
Debt financing exceeding the optimal capital structure of the firm can be difficult. The result
tells us that the sign of debt-to-equity ratio is negative, and the result is statistically significant.
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Nevertheless, it is important to note that this model cannot completely explain the
causality between land prices and debt-to-equity ratio. It can be argued that land prices will
increase because private firms can borrow funds and invest more in land because of a low
debt-to-equity ratio. We can also argue, however, that an increase in land price lowers the level
of debt-to-equity ratio. Finalizing the issue requires a more sophisticated causality analysis.
I mentioned earlier that the sign of the coefficient of interest rate might be positive in
Japan. The result shows that the sign is negative, but it is not statistically significant. It is
basically reasonable to assume that real estate prices are negatively correlated to interest rate
levels according to the neoclassical investment theory. The recent trend, however, shows a
positive relationship between the two variables. During the bubble economy, government
continued to increase interest rates in order to cool off the overheated stock and real estate prices.
After the burst of the bubble economy, the official discount rate had decreased to almost zero








correlation between two variables, and to make the result statistically insignificant in the model.
Land prices are positively correlated to the demand for land, but the result is not statistically
significant. Therefore, the excess cash and the amount of debt available to private firms seem to
have a strong impact on land price movements. The total amount of funds currently available
for real estate investment can be an important determinant of land prices.
3.3 Finance Matters in the Space Market
We learned in the previous section that the relationship between finance and land prices
is strong. The introduced model is simple, but because of the simplicity, the result tells us the
importance of finance in the real estate market.
In this section, I will continue the same approach as to the amount of construction.
Thus, the notation to be applied here is that the total amount of funds currently available for real
estate investments is an important determinant of how much new property is built. Before
examining the functionality between finance and construction, I will briefly explain the history of
the supply of buildings.
Figure 3-4 shows that there are two peaks of construction, in 1973 and in 1990. The
overall trend of the supply of commercial buildings is relatively level. On the other hand, the
supply of manufacturing and mining facilities is slightly downward sloping throughout the
period.
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Source: Bank of Japan, Economic and Financial Data on CD-ROM, 2000, thousand square meter
Note: Shaded areas express major economic expansions and depressions.
Although we cannot tell from the figure, data prior to the period shows that the supply of
manufacturing and mining facilities outweighs the supply of commercial buildings. The low
level of construction in the manufacturing and mining sectors after the first oil crisis is consistent
with my argument that Japanese industrial firms lost their primary objectives (to catch up with
the Western Europe and American economies in terms of production) and no longer had a focus
for investing funds. Since it can be assumed that these funds were used to build commercial
buildings, the analysis will focus on the supply of commercial buildings in order to clearly
observe the importance of finance in the space market.
3.3.1 Construction Regression Analysis
(1) Model Specification
The model introduced in this analysis is basically the same as used in the land price
regression model. The basic equation is as follows:
St =f(P, C, L, I, D) (a)
where St is the amount of commercial building construction (categorized by the Ministry of
Construction as "commercial and service" facility), P denotes land prices that we examined
earlier (land price index), C is excess cash in firms (liquidity ratio), L is debt-to-equity ratio of
firms, I is risk-free interest rate, and D denotes demand for commercial space (GDP). I exclude
the values of private firms (market stock prices), and instead include land price in this model.
Basically, financial institutions lend funds based on land collateral values. Therefore, this
model will help us clearly observe the influence of land collateral values on the amount of
construction. Then, the model is specified as follows:
St = O+/P+/?2C+AL+/hI+?sD+6 (b)
(2) Data Description
Time series used in this model are from 1971/3rd to 1999/1st quarter.
Supplv of Space: Construction (S)
As a measure of the amount of constructions, I use the commercial and service
construction floor areas started, measured by thousand square meters, tabulated quarterly by the
Ministry of Construction. The actual data is obtained from the Economic and Financial Data on
CD-ROM issued by the Research and Statistics Department of the Bank of Japan.
Land Price (P)
The land price index divided by GDP deflator will be used in this analysis.
Excess Cash for Firms (C)
I use the same data used in the previous model as the variable.
Debt to Equity Ratio (L)
I use the same data used in the previous model as the variable.
Interest Rate (I)
I use the same data used in the previous model as the variable.
Demand for Commercial Space (D)
Unlike in the previous model, I use real GDP as the variable.
(3) Re-specification of the Model
I adjust the model in the same way that I did in the land price regression model. I
include not only current values but also lagged values of all the independent variables in the final
model because there are usually time lags between the change in exogenous factors that influence
the amount of construction and the actual start date of construction (mainly due to design work,
application for construction permit to local governments, and so forth).
The method to include and remove variables is completely the same. The two variables
that represent interest rate and demand for commercial space are completely eliminated from the
model, since the exclusion of these variables improves adjusted-R 2. As a result of the
re-specification of the model, the final model can be specified as follows:
St = flo+,84P+8 22C +/?2L+s (c)
where Edenotes the current and lagged values as explained above.
(4) Results
Table 3-3 shows the result of this model. We will first notice that the amount of
construction is positively correlated to land price movements, and the result is statistically
significant.
Table 3- 3 Estimates of the Commercial Space Supply Model
Predicted Signs of Estimated Parameter T-Stat
Variables
so (Constant) ------- 441.33 2.20
Pi (P: Land Price) + 12,657.55 13.97
P2 (C: Excess Cash) + 79.58 2.71
P3 (L: Debt to Equity Ratio) 107.63 3.52
R-square
Adjusted R-square




An increase in land prices implies an increased land collateral value. For a given level of the
amount of debt in a firm, increased collateral values will likely allow the firm to employ more
debt, resulting in the supply of commercial buildings.
The amount of construction is also positively correlated to excess cash available to
private firms, the same consequence as we saw in the previous analysis. On the other hand, the
effect of debt-to-equity ratio is puzzling. The sign of coefficient of debt-to-equity ratio is
positive, whereas it was negative in the previous model. A couple of suppositions can be made
regarding this issue. First, the high level of aggregate debt-to-equity ratio implies that economic
fundamentals are good at that time. This in turn indicates the strong demand for office space, a
good time for real estate investors to build commercial buildings. Next, in theory, the high level
of aggregate debt-to-equity ratio signals that a cost of capital is relatively cheap. This can
motivate real estate investors to employ debt and construct buildings.
In any case, the relationship of the amount of construction with financial environment
can be relatively strong, especially with land prices that are significantly affected by financial
factors. The result would show us that the total amount of funds currently available for real
estate investment affected the amount of construction.
3.4 Discussion
We have just examined that finance conditions have influenced land prices and the
amount of construction. However, the amount of cash reserves in private firms, represented by
liquidity ratio in the model, and the amount of debt available to private firms tended to fluctuate
from time to time. Consequently, an oscillation of land prices and construction occurred.
Figure 3-5 shows the movements of vacancy rates of office buildings in the Tokyo
metropolitan area, and the rates throughout Japan except in the Tokyo metropolitan area. The
research was done by the Japan Building Association.
Figure 3- 5 The Movements of Vacancy Rate (Office Building)
Source: Japan Building Association, Biru Jittai Chousa
Notice that there are two peaks after the high economic growth period, one in 1977 and
the other in 1995. Notice also Figure 3-4, which describes the Construction Floor Areas Started.
Obviously, this comparison shows that the increase in vacancy rates around 1977 was due to the
huge increase of construction started around 1973. Similarly, the huge increase in vacancy rates
around 1995 was brought about by skyrocketing construction around 1990. The level of
vacancy rates can be the measure of floor areas necessary for the economy. Therefore, the data
tells us that the amount of construction of commercial space was not perfectly related to the
strength of economy in general during these periods. According to the previous model, these
additional supplies were more or less triggered by finance conditions at any given time.
We can also find excessive construction in the form of office buildings built by firms
whose primary businesses were basically unrelated to real estate. As mentioned earlier, the
desire of private firms to build their own office buildings is potentially strong. This type of
construction will likely be made when these firms obtain additional funds. However, this
construction significantly affected the property market.
Generally, these firms will terminate their lease contracts and move their operations into
their newly-built office buildings. The spaces they vacate will increase the supply of a rentable
officer space. Furthermore, additional supply may arise from their new buildings, since these
firms might not occupy entire buildings themselves.
Exhibit 2 summarizes the profile of office building projects started during the bubble
economy period (from 1989 to 1991), and started after 1999, respectively. These tables were
created by the author based primarily on news reports appearing on such newspapers as the
Nihon Keizai, Nikkei Sangyou, and Kensetsu Kougyou Shinbun.
I categorize building owners by their primary businesses. "Real Estate" includes office
building companies and real estate developers. Trading companies are also included in this
category because they have often functioned as real estate developers throughout history
(Matsubara 1988). I distinguish "Construction" and "Life Insurance" companies from others,
since they are considered to be institutional investors in the Japanese real estate market.
"Other" refers to private industries such as food, telecommunications, broadcasting, and
advertising, not included in the previous categories.
During the bubble economy, office buildings built by "Other" industries accounted for
approximately 62%, but recently their shares went down to approximately 40% of the total floor
area. This may imply that these non-professional investors build office buildings only when
they have excess funds. Thus, it is assumed that this supply of available space was created by
the lower costs of capital resulting from the inefficient financial and credit system. I will
discuss this issue in the next chapter.
4 Alternative Model of the Real Estate Market
In the previous chapter, I argued that finance matters in the real estate market. In
particular, I discussed that government and private industry established a credit and financial
system based on land collateral. In the two regression analyses, the close relationship between
real estate investments and finance conditions were observed. I then proposed that the financial
system based on land collateral provided relatively lower costs of capital to private firms, and
that these funds flowed into the real estate market, resulting in the booms and busts after the high
economic growth period.
Relative cost and the amount of capital are decisive factors of the real estate market. In
order to avoid the misdirection of funds, I will now propose several factors for establishing an
alternative model of the real estate market.
4.1 Financial and Credit System
The emerging internet business sector, which is least likely to own good collateral land,
and the penetration by the American and European banks into the Japanese financial market are
forcing Japanese banks to change their inefficient credit system. For instance, they have began
to offer non-recourse loans. In case of default, the lender has no recourse to assets that are not
related to the objects of the loans. Thus, overall land collateral values of borrowers are
irrelevant to whether loans are made or not.
Some changes have been made in the public market, too. The Tokyo Stock Exchange
(TSE) launched "Mothers" (Market of the high-growth and emerging stocks) in May 2000.
Mothers is the new stock market introduced to provide easier funding for emerging companies
with high growth potential, and to offer a wider choice of investment instruments for investors.
The Osaka Stock Exchange (OSE) also established the Nasdaq Japan Market as one of its
sections in June 2000. The foundation of these markets is aimed at generating more
opportunities for the growth and the success of emerging Japanese companies, especially
high-tech, growth-oriented companies, by creating an efficient market that links investors and
entrepreneurs directly and easily, just like Nasdaq in the United States, or Neuer Markt in
Germany.
Although financing options for Japanese firms, especially for venture companies, has
widened in recent times, the dependency upon real assets in evaluating companies has continued
to be dominant. For example, the loan balance secured by land collateral accounted for 25.7%
(125.8 trillion yen) of the total loan balance of the Japanese financial institutions in the 1989
fiscal year. Although the percentage went down slightly to 23.5% in the 1997 fiscal year, the
balance had increased by approximately 2.1 trillion yen during the period1 . The supply of funds
based on real assets was one of the largest culprits in the misdirection of funds. This system
provided private firms with lower costs of capital relative to the investment risk. Therefore, the
establishment of an efficient financial market will be a critical first step toward building an
appropriate model of the real estate market.
4.2 Tenancy Law and the Interaction of Asset Market and Property Market
The tenancy law that regulates the relationship between landlords and tenants has long a
considerable influence on the space market.
The so-called tenancy law (Shakuchi Shakuya Hou) was initially established in 1941 as a
part of wartime emergency legislation. Its provisions do not allow a landlord to evict a tenant
'Bank of Japan, Keizai Toukei Nenpou, 1998
unless the landlord has a legitimate reason, such as when the landlord moves into the property for
residence, and when, at the same time, the property in dispute is the only place in which the
landlord can live. Furthermore, the law gives the tenant the right to renegotiate rents and to
terminate the tenancy during the lease period. The law was designed to protect the socially
weaker class (i.e. tenants) during wartime, but it was continued after the war since the SCAP2
believed the landlord-tenant (semi-feudal) system was the social root that had led Japan to
militarism 3. Following an immediate housing shortage after the war, the application of the law
was strengthened, and, what is more, the scope of the law was extended to covering business
tenancy4. As a consequence, we could find two different rents: the "market rent" and the
"existing rent".
The market rent is the rent that a new tenant pays to occupy the space initially. It is
determined mainly by supply and demand, as we would see in any other place throughout the
world. Therefore, the new tenant might have to pay a much higher rent than existing tenants of
the building.
The existing rent is the rent an existing tenant pays when renewing the lease contract.
It is determined mainly by a tenant-owner negotiation, where the tenancy law comes into play.
As we saw above, the tenant's right to occupy the office space is strongly protected: the owner
cannot raise rent discretionally, nor replace the tenant with a tenant willing to pay a higher market
rent. Usually existing rent will increase so as to cover an increase in expenses. In this sense,
existing rent is not perfectly affected by supply-demand conditions in the space market.
2 See section 2.1.2.
3 As I mentioned earlier, this semi-feudal system is also considered to be the root of the idea that land is the most
valuable asset.
4 Masayuki Tagai, Unlocking Japan's Potential GDP, 2000, MIT Sloan Thesis
This market imperfection creates inefficiency. First, the supply of buildings is limited
due to the tenancy law. For instance, once a landowner builds an office building and tenants
occupy the space, prospective cash flows will be locked, since the landowner will be unable to
raise rents or evict tenants. Thus, one may say that there is a value of "option to wait" for
landowners to capture the greatest upside potential5 . People often argue that this supply
limitation due to the tenancy law pushes up overall rent levels in Japan6 .
It seems that this imperfect space market has also given rise to the misallocation of space
and distorted the formation of urban areas. For instance, a tenant occupying a class-A building
from decades ago pays a rent far below the prevailing market rent. Since the landlord of the
building cannot evict the tenant, she/he cannot lease it to a candidate who is willing and able to
pay market rent. If the candidate is the one who can most benefit from the location, and if the
existing tenant is not, a misallocation of the space can occur. Thus, the current market system
will likely sustain these old-fashioned firms with fewer growth opportunities, and prevent
growing firms from occupying the most suitable locations.
It is also reasonable to assume that this issue has influenced the formation of urban areas.
If a high degree of legal protection did not exist, the existing tenant in the previous example
would be forced to move to another location, where a rent would be sustainable for the firm.
Eventually, the decentralizing of firms would take place, which would change the formation of
urban areas7. Moreover, the supply of the class-A buildings would increase because of the
decentralizing of these firms. As a result, rent levels of class-A space would be lowered. Thus,
5 See Jiro Yoshida, Effect of Uncertainty on the Investment Decision, 1999, MIT MSRED Thesis, although the
interpretation of the option is different from that mentioned in this paper.
6 The tenancy law also prevents the supply of land, resulting in extreme prices of land.
7 As a reference of firm's decentralizing, see D. DiPasquale and W. C Wheaton, Urban Economics and Real Estate
Markets, 1996, Prentice-Hall, Inc.
the imperfect market shaped by the high degree of legal tenant protection might be one reason
why rents and corresponding land prices are so high in midtown Tokyo8 .
4.3 Real Estate Investors
As discussed earlier, real estate ownership has significantly affected not only the real
estate market, but also the entire economy. To explore an alternative model of the real estate
market, we need to consider who should be real estate investors in the twenty-first century. It is
important to notice that there are several problems with the current real estate ownership. Also
note that I will discuss the overview of real estate investors in APPENDIX 3.
4.3.1 Agency Problems
There are agency problems for current institutional real estate investors. Downs (1991)
argued9 , "As long as real estate developers can finance out of individual deals - that is borrow, or
raise as equity funds, more money than their projects cost, and have none of their own capital at
risk - they will continue to construct more space, regardless of whether the market really needs
it". This was what exactly happened in Japan during the bubble economy, and this can occur
not only with developers, but also with any private firms with good land collateral.
Another agency problem includes a "herd" problem. Downs also addressed, "the
group-think occurs partly because institutional investors are primarily driven by short-run goals,
8 Although the new tenancy law was introduced in 1992, I did not mention the effect, since the influence of the new
law to the market has been minor.
9 Anthony Downs, What have we learned from the 1980s experience?, Real Estate Investment, 1991, Solomon
Brothers.
such as quarterly performance reports, rather than longer-term considerations. Because each is
judged with a small group of his or her peers, no one wants to behave much differently from
those peers". Such mentality is likely to exist in a homogeneous country like Japan.
These agency problems tend to encourage market oscillations. Thus, an alternative
model needs to be one in which investors have heterogeneous views toward future and interact
efficiently in the markets. REITs are one of the investment vehicles that allow small investors
as well as overseas investors to participate in the markets.
4.3.2 Diversification Fallacy and Specialization Advantage
Some may argue that there must be asset diversification benefits for firms to incorporate
real estate into their portfolios. In fact, Japanese firms have sometimes realized profits (land
price appreciation) by selling assets when their business experienced downturns 0 . One may
also say that firms owning rental office buildings can stabilize their incomes regardless of the
performance of their main businesses. The argument that real estate works to hedge against
inflation might also be made. Most real estate managers in private firms will emphasize these
arguments.
These arguments are made in the belief that investors will benefit from a firm's policy of
asset diversification, since investors are by nature risk averse. Diversifying asset allocation
gives these firms a better opportunity to increase their value than those firms which concentrate
their investments in one area. The question arises, however, as to what is a real benefit for
investors. According to the M&M theory, the incremental value that firms can produce from a
10 On the balance sheets of Japanese corporations, in accordance with Japanese accounting principles, market-related
assets, such as stocks and real estate, are evaluated not at their current market prices but at their purchase prices.
The government is planning to revise these principles.
policy of diversification is limited to the portion that investors cannot implement on their own.
Thus, if investors can include real estate assets in their portfolios, no incremental value will be
provided to investors. There might have been some incremental values for investors in the
sense that investors were not able to include the real estate assets like class-A office buildings in
midtown Tokyo. Nevertheless, emerging J-REITs will allow investors to have these
opportunities in the near future, when firms' real estate investment may lose the validity. This
argument also implies that there might exist specialization advantage for private firms.
One of the largest professional real estate investors in the Japanese market are real estate
developers. Unlike their counterparts in the United State, Japanese developers typically own
office buildings, shopping centers, retail malls, hotels, and resort facilities after their
developments. If there is a specialization advantage for private firms, these developers should
focus their businesses only on developments, and dispose of their assets in more efficient
investment vehicles such as REITs.
In fact, recent empirical work seems to suggest that diversification at the firm level
destroys the firm's value. Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1990) show that firms experience
negative returns when they announce acquisitions that are unrelated to their primary business.
Lang and Stulz (1994), and Berger and Ofek (1995) find that the stocks of diversified firms are
traded at a discount of at least 13 to 15 percent relative to the stocks of stand-alone firms in the
same industries.
4.3.3 Asset-Liability Matching Argument and Pension Fund
Among institutional investors, pension funds are best suited to invest in real estate
because of the characteristics of their liability obligations. Pension funds have much
longer-term liabilities than insurance companies and other institutional investors. And real
estate properties need a longer-term investment horizon corresponding to their relatively long
economic lives. In theory, pension funds can be the most logical source for future real estate
equity.
However, Japanese pension funds have not been key players. Although regulatory issues
can explain most of the reasons for this, it is not as clear as it may seem. Indeed, there was a
regulation that imposed an optimal portfolio on pension funds, but it did not ban pensions from
investing in real estate. Generally speaking, allocation must follow these rules: at least 50% of a
fund should be invested in basically riskless Japanese corporate and government bonds; no more
than 30% can be in equities or overseas investments; and a maximum of 20% may be placed in
real estate. Nevertheless, their actual real estate investments have been quite minor.
However, the prospective influence of pension funds on the future real estate market can
be enormous. First, deregulation regarding asset allocation has continued since the bubble
economy burst. Fund managers of pension funds can use more discretion in putting their money
into various types of assets. Second, the Japanese pensions market is reaching a crucial junction.
Fund performance has plummeted due to Japan's lingering recession and slumping stock prices.
To pursue higher returns, pension funds will shift assets to financial products with more risk,
where real estate investments can serve as investment products with relative returns and risks.
The size of the pension funds will reach 100 trillion yen in the future, which would put
Japan close behind the United States and other countries where pension plans are more pervasive.
As we can see from history, the background and the government's intervention of the Japanese
pension system, large amounts of direct real estate investments will not occur immediately, but
indirect investment through securitized products such as J-REITs can be a reasonably assumed.
If 10% of pension fund assets are allocated in J-REIT, it will be close to a total market
capitalization of $136 billion of the US REIT market". More detailed information as to
pensions will appear in APPENDIX 3.
4.3.4 Direct Investment or Indirect Investment
Most real estate investments have been directly made by corporate investors. Although
there have been indirect investments through quasi-securitized products", they almost died out
after the bubble economy burst13 . This is partly because the primary objective of these products
was to reduce inheritance tax during the bubble economy (also refer to the section 2.2.2 "Tax
consideration in owning land"14), and also because secondary markets for these products were not
established.
I discussed in section 4.3.2 that there is no diversification premium at the firm level as
long as investors can replicate the same portfolio by themselves. At the investor level, on the
other hand, portfolio theory tells that there is a benefit by diversifying their asset allocation.
With a large number of asset allocations, investors would ultimately be able to reduce investment
risks down to a systematic risk. Thus, they have a rational motivation to include real estate in
their portfolios.
Portfolio theory, however, assumes that investors can rebalance their asset allocation
with minimum costs when macroeconomic factors change. Nevertheless, because each piece of
real estate is unique, and the amount of money needed to invest in real estate is typically large,
11 PricewaterhouseCoopers and Lend Lease Real Estate Investments, Emerging Trends in Real Estate 2000, 1999.
12 The so-called "One-Room Mansion Investment". Reference: Hitoshi Mikuni, Fudousan no Shoukenka to
Houhou, 1997, Touyou Keizai.
13 There are also some investment schemes using securtization. However, these schemes are basically limited to
professional intuitional investors.
14 Tax saving effects for investors is a little different from those mentioned in the section 2.2.2. Ibid.
direct investors will find it difficult to change their portfolios. This inefficiency can be avoided
when there is a market in which a number of different investors can trade their assets. Indirect
investment through investment vehicles will allow investors to put their money in an efficient
way, as will be discussed in the following section.
4.3.5 Functions of REITs
(1) REIT as an Intermediary
Convenience of denomination is usually seen as one of the main justifications of
financial intermediation. It means that the bank chooses the unit size (denomination) of its
products (deposits and loans) in a way that is convenient for its clients. A typical example is
that of small depositors facing large investors who are willing to borrow indivisible amounts. If
the M&M theory holds, the denomination function of financial intermediation will have no value,
and the bank will not obtain any rewards. The actual financial market is not perfectly efficient,
and neither is the real estate market. REITs are assumed to provide convenience of
denomination to investors, since real estate assets are also indivisible. We should note that this
function of REITs makes the real estate market closer to the M&M theory.
(2) REIT as a Dealer
In the United States, a number of commercial real estate investors needed to desperately
recapitalize their investments by the early 1990's. However, no private or institutional capital
existed in the market during that period. There were some foreign investors, like Japanese
corporate investors, but the necessary amount of money exceeded the funds they had available.
As a result, investors came up with approaching the public capital market.
15 Xavier Freixas and Jean-Charles Rochet, Microeconomics of Banking, 1997, The MIT Press.
Today, exactly the same thing is happening in the Japanese real estate market. Many
investors who put huge amounts of money into real estate during the bubble economy are
desperately trying to restructure their portfolios. However, since almost all firms' balance
sheets suffered, no private capital is waiting to retire their burdens. Although foreign investors
are looking for investment opportunities, a fundamental system to provide funds to the market
needs to be established, i.e. the emergence of J-REITs.
We must now look at the reasons why REITs in the United States helped reactivate the
market, and why the Japanese government and private industry expect the same effects to be
created by J-REITs.
Financial market microstructure analyzes how specific trading mechanisms affect the
price formation process. These mechanisms involve a specific intermediary such as a dealer,
and employ a certain location of trading such as an exchange. The financial market typically
involves dealers at centralized markets. On the other hand, there is no centralized market place
as to real estate. Thus, dealers do not exist in the direct real estate market. Market
microstructure theory argues that the services of these dealers characterize price formation in
each market.
An inventory-based approach is one of the basic ways to conceptualize these dealer
services. Dealers take short-term positions (holding assets for a while) by buying and selling
assets. In this sense, they provide liquidity and immediacy in markets. Their short-term
positions, however, involve the risk arising from the imbalances of buy-sell orders because the
imbalances create an inventory holding problems for dealers. Consequently, dealers set bid and
ask spreads enough to compensate this inventory risk.
When real estate markets crash, sell orders will increase, whereas buy orders will
decrease. The market will lose liquidity and immediacy due to the absence of dealers. It can
be assumed that REITs functioned as dealers around the 1990s in the illiquid United States real
estate market.
In the Japanese real estate market, the imbalances of order flows are severe, and a huge
bid and ask spread seems to exist. If J-REITs provide the dealer service to the market, they will
work at least until the liquidity and immediacy are regained, and bid and ask spread is cleared in
the market16
4.3.6 J-REIT
The current ban on REITs is expected to be lifted once the investment-trust law is
revised during the current Diet session (as of 4/28/2000). In anticipation, the Tokyo Stock
Exchange plans to create a market for the instruments by the end of the year. It will set up a
market for corporate-type investment trusts centering on J-REITs. Listing criteria could demand
a minimum investor figure of 800 and a minimum trading unit of 4,000 lots.
In the United States, REITs are popular investment tools for institutional investors as
well as for individuals. As of June 30, 1999, REITs had a total market capitalization of
approximately $136 billion17 . In Japan, investments from pensions are also expected, as
mentioned in the previous section. Furthermore, a significant amount in postal savings time
deposits is due to mature in the coming months. Some 106 trillion yen (approximately $1,000
billion) in postal "teigaku," or fixed-amount, savings accounts will mature by the end of fiscal
2001. If we succeed in establishing a system and environment that give small investors
16 Timothy Riddiough, Real Estate Capital Markets (Lecture Note), 2000, MIT.
17 Ibid.
opportunities to participate in the real estate market, the prospective feature of real estate
ownership in Japan will completely change.
5 Simulation under an Alternative Model of the Real Estate Market
As discussed in the previous chapter, the Japanese financial and real estate markets are
experiencing many inefficiency problems. The inefficiency is considered to have created the
bubble economy and its burst. I also mentioned key factors to establish an alternative market
model, particularly in three aspects: the financial market, the asset and property markets, and the
investors' profile. In this chapter, I will simulate what the market would have been like,
assuming that the alternative model had been introduced before the first oil crisis.
5.1 First Simulation
5.1.1 Methodology
The primary objective of this simulation is to estimate asset prices under the alternative
market model, and to compare the estimated prices with actual asset prices. In the simulation, I
will assume that the main factors discussed in the previous chapter are satisfied before the
examined period.
First, I will assume that the financial market is efficient. Thus, financial mix (debt or
equity) is irrelevant, and financial capitals are always perfectly priced. In a sense, real estate
investors can obtain costs of capital that are perfectly priced at an efficient financial market.
Second, I will assume that the interaction of the asset market and the property market is
efficient. This means that landlords adjust rents perfectly to prevailing market rent at any time.
Lastly, I will assume that investors are generic and have the same investment policy.
For instance, I will assume that the risk premium that each investor demands is the same, and the
forecast of future rent growth is also the same among all investors. They use the same discount
cash flow model to price investments.
5.1.2 Model Specification
The present value model in its simplest form assumes that the real estate asset market
can be approximated in frictionless entire asset markets. Then, further assuming that all
investors agree on the same risk premium for real estate investment throughout the period, we
have the familiar no-arbitrage condition:
Pt = Rt+I/(1+it+I+f/) + Rt+2 /(1+it+2+/)2 + R++(1+it+s+))3 + . .. . . .
where Pt denotes real estate asset price at the year t, R is rent at the year t, it denotes risk-free
interest rate at the year t, and zis the risk premium on which all investors agree.
In principle, there can be a different interest rate for each future period. For simplicity,
however, I will avoid complications by assuming that the term structure of interest rates is flat; in
other words, the interest rate is the same regardless of the time of the cash flow. Thus, I replace
the series of interest rates it+, it+2, it+3, etc., with a single rate it. Now I can write the formula as:
Pt = Rt+1/(1+it i/) + Rt+2/( +i,+))2 + Rt+3/(1+i+ )3 +. . . . . .
I will also make assumptions as to rent growth rate in order to realize an efficient market
and to keep the simulation as simple as possible. All investors agree on the rent growth rate
from the year t to the year t+10, and the rate is calculated based on the past rent growth rates
available at the year t. Furthermore, they also agree on the growth rate after the year t+11.
The rate is computed based on past inflation rates observed at the year t. Therefore, the model
will become as follows:
Pt = Rt*(1 +ga)/(1+it+)) + Rt*(1 +ga)2/(1+it+i)2 + . ... .+ Rt*(1+gw)1/(1+it+)
+ Rt*(]+ga)'o *(1+gg)/(1+it+1)f)" + Rt*(1+gw)Jo *(1+gg)
2 +it+) 2 . . . . . .
where g, denotes the rent growth rate estimated at the year t. The same rate is applied from the
year t to t+10. gg denotes the rent growth rate estimated at the year t, and is used after the year
t+11. Then, for simplicity, I introduce cap rate and modify the above equation as follows:
Pt=Rt*(1 +ga)/(it+r-ga)-Rt*(1 +gc)/(it+r-gc)/(1 +i+)' +R1*(1 +g,)' 0 *(I +g,)/(it+-g,g)/(1 +i+) '0
5.1.3 Data Specification
Rent (R)
I compute market office rents at each year from the MTB-IKOMA Real Estate
Investment Index issued by the Mitsubishi Trust and Banking Corporation and the Ikoma Data
Service System Co., Ltd., published in 1998. This index is the best performance index of office
building investment currently available in Japan. It computed three types of investment return
indicators. The way to compute each return indicator is as follows.
1) Income Return (%) = Rent during one year / Asset Price at the beginning of the year
2) Capital Appreciation Return (%) = (Asset Price at the end of the year - Asset Price at the
beginning of the year) / Asset Price at the beginning of the year
3) Total Return (%) = Income Return + Capital Appreciation Return
The asset prices at each year is the sum of both land prices published every year by the
National Land Agency, and building costs assuming that a full-FAR' new office building is built
each year at prevailing construction costs.
I use the aggregate three major metropolitan areas (Tokyo, Osaka, and Nagoya) data
from 1970 to 1998 in order to calculate rents, although the actual time series to be examined in
the simulation will be from 1974 to 1997 due to the limited availability of other variables. First,
I set the asset price at the end of 1969 (the beginning of 1970) as 100. The asset price at the end
of each year (1970 - 1997) is computed as follows:
- Price in1970 = Price 1969 (=100) * (1 + Capital Appreciation Return in 1970)
Floor-Area-Ratio is the arithmetic relationship of the total square feet of a building to the square footage of the land
area.
- Price in1971 = Price 1970 * (1 + Capital Appreciation Return in 1971)
and so forth. In the end, I can obtain asset prices of all years from 1970 to 1997. The asset
prices will also be used as actual asset prices when I compare them with estimated asset prices
calculated under the alternative model assumption. Finally, rent revenues during each year are
computed by multiplying a beginning asset price of a year by income return (%) at the same year.
The rent calculated above is market rent prevailing in each year. Although I assume
that landlords can adjust their rents to market rent, they cannot completely change rents every
year partly because of the lease term (the typical length of lease term is two year in Japan).
Therefore, I smooth rent fluctuations by taking the average of the market rents at the year t and at
the year t-1.
Rent Growth Rate 1 (g,: from time t to t+10)
I assume that all investors at the year t estimate prospective rent growth rates from time t
to t+10 based on the historical movement of rents. This is computed by taking the average of
three rent growth rates of past and current years: gt = {(Rt-2/Rt-3-1) + (Ri1/Rt-2-1) +
(Rt/Rt.- -1)}/3
Rent Growth Rate 2 (g after time t+11)
I will also assume that all investors at the year t forecast prospective rent growth rates
after time t+l 1 based on past GDP deflators. It is computed by taking the average of GDP
deflators from 1955 to the year t:
gpt= (D 19 55 + D1956 +. . . . . . . + Dt1 + Dt)/(t-1955+1)
where Dt denotes GDP deflator at the year t. GDP deflators are obtained from the Annual
Report on National Accounts provided by the Economic Planning Agency.
Risk-free Rate (i)
As a risk-free interest rate at each year, I use a 10-year government bond yearly yield
with the longest remaining maturity obtained from the Economic and Financial Data issued by
the Bank of Japan.
Risk Premium for Real Estate Investment (z)
The Japan Real Estate Institute published the Survey on Japanese Real Estate Investors
in April 1999. According to the survey, the average risk premium that Japanese institutional
investors applied to real estate investments was 3.50%. Thus, I use this rate as the risk premium
throughout the period.
5.1.4 Limitation of the Simulation
Unfortunately, there are several limitations in the simulation. First, the market rent (R)
in the model is computed based on actual market rents that were influenced by a high degree of
legal protection for tenants. As discussed earlier, the tenancy law has prevented landlords from
providing office space to the market. If the law had not existed, the market rent level could
have been lower and less volatile than the actual rent2, but it is too difficult to include this effect
in the simulation. Second, I take the supply of office as given. The actual movement of asset
prices had an impact on the supply of office space, which in turn affected market rent. Thus, if
assets had been priced under the alternative model, the amount of construction and resulting
market rent would have been different from the actual movements. This effect is not included in
the model either.
2 It is important to note the different definitions of market rent and existing rent. The market rent in the model is the
rent that a new tenant pays when it begins occupancy. This rent is determined by the market condition. The
existing rent is determined by a negotiation between the landlord and the existing tenant at the renewal of lease
contract. The existing rent levels have been lowered and less volatile by the tenancy law. On the other hand, the
tenancy law is considered to raise market rent level and increase its volatility. Please refer to section 4.2.
5.1.5 Result and Discussion
Figure 5-1 shows the result of this simulation. I will begin the discussion from an
overall comparison between two asset price movements. Actual asset prices seem to follow the
land price movement of the major metropolitan areas. This trend matches the fact that the cost
of land accounts for a large portion of the total costs of office building investments, especially in
the metropolitan areas. Short-term fluctuations are more observed in the estimated price
movement than in the actual price movement. I assume that the markets are so efficient that
investments are always perfectly valued. Therefore, asset prices in an efficient markets will
more likely fluctuate in the short run in response to changes in economic factors such as interest
rate, rent growth forecast, and so forth. This short-term fluctuation, in turn, might be able to
control a larger long-term oscillation, although this effect is not incorporated in the simulation, as
discussed earlier.
In the longer-run, on the other hand, the volatility of asset prices is larger in the actual
prices than in the estimated prices. The underlying issue is that the inefficient market can dull
the ability of market participants to respond immediately to the signs of exogenous changes.
For instance, the financial market has continued to provide lower costs of capital even when more
risks have been predicted. Institutional investors tend to have agency problems such as trend
chasing and herding behavior that create below average risk-adjusted returns.
In examining the result in more detail, I will begin with the period soon after the first oil
crisis (1974-1975). The estimated asset prices exceed the actual prices in 1976 and 1977.
Figure 5- 1 Comparison between Actual Asset Price and Estimated Price (Basic Simulation)
It may seem strange that in the simulation the estimated asset prices continue to increase during
the depression soon after the oil crisis. One possible reason is that the Japanese economy
experienced very high inflation around this period. Thus, the market rent continued to rise even
during the depression. Indeed, the rent growth rate reached a high of 26% in 1974, and 22% in
1975. Furthermore, as inflation rates gradually went down, interest rates began to decrease from
the end of 1976. In fact, the government lowered the official discount rate from 9% to 6.5%
during the year 1975. These two mixed effects seem to increase the estimated asset price in mid
1970s.
As mentioned in chapter three, the Japanese economy before the first oil crisis was
booming, and much construction began between 1972 and 1974. This oversupply of office
buildings, together with the shakeout of inflation, decreased market rent after 1977. Although
actual prices continued to increase after the oil crisis, the estimated prices in the simulation go
down in response to negative rent growth forecast.
After several years of equilibrium, the Japanese economy plunged into the bubble
economy around 1985. Both prices move differently during the bubble economy period.
Unlike the actual prices, which went up and down fairly linearly with a peak in 1990, the
estimated prices reach high levels in 1989, goes down slightly in 1990, and then reaches their
highest levels in 1992 in the simulation. A couple of reasons can be proposed. First, the
government raised the official discount rate from 2.5% in the first quarter of 1989 to 6.0% in the
fourth quarter of 1990. This huge increase in interest rate is immediately reflected in the
discount rate that lowers the estimated prices in 1990. Next, the market rent continued to
increase, hitting its highest level in 1992. At the same time, the government lowered the official
discount rate from 6.0% in 1991 to 3.25% in 1992. These combined effects would make the
estimated prices reach their highest levels in 1992 in the simulation.
On the other hand, the actual prices continued to increase until 1990, and then continued
to decrease after 1990. This is partly because Japanese firms did not use the discount cash flow
method by which asset prices are priced more sensitively to the fluctuation of interest rate.
Other possible reasons, as mentioned earlier, include agency problems such as trend chasing and
herding behavior, and an inefficient financial market. As discussed in chapter three, the amount
of debt provided by financial institutions largely depended on the land collateral value of
borrowers. It may be assumed that in an inefficient market, when asset prices increase, private
firms can employ more debt and invest in real estate assets, which further drives up asset prices.
However, the opposite mechanism may work when asset prices are decreasing. When collateral
value of the firm decreases below the face value of debt, financial institutions basically demand a
margin call or other collateral enough to satisfy the face value of debt. This requires borrowers
to sell off real estate assets, sometime at fire sale prices, which further drives asset prices down.
It is often pointed out that this spiral mechanism was observed throughout the course of the
bubble economy and its burst.
Interestingly, in the simulation the estimated prices exceed the actual prices in 1997.
Nevertheless, the truth is that real estate asset prices continued to decrease, and have not yet
touched bottom. The simulation tells us some implications related to this issue. First, this
continuous decline in actual real estate prices might be inconsistent with economic fundamentals
surrounding the real estate market. As mentioned earlier, it can be assumed that the opposite
mechanism of what occurred during the bubble economy is happening today, i.e. the lower the
land collateral, the higher the cost of capital.
Next, it is also assumed that the market has lost liquidity, and the trading of real estate
has been paralyzed. In this situation, the true underlying asset prices are not obvious to market
participants, which can further decrease asset prices. As discussed in the previous chapter,
J-REITs can provide the market with immediacy and liquidity. If J-REITs work as a dealer in
the asset market, the simulation indicates that asset prices will go up in the future in that dealers
inform the market true underlying asset prices.
5.2 Second Simulation: Investors with Perfect Foresight
Efficiently priced capital will choke off over-development tendencies. Unlike direct
investment by institutional investors with various agency problems, investments through the
public capital market are relatively efficient. REIT investors are much more likely to notice the
prospective change in exogenous factors, and tend to react relatively sooner than institutional
investors. When they notice an oversupply of office space, they will raise costs of capital for
REITs. This capital market discipline will discourage further development and help keep space
market in equilibrium. I will take the foresight of the capital market investors into account by
adding another variable onto the previous simulation.
5.2.1 Methodology and Model Specification
Basically, the methodology, model, and data used in the simulation are the same as used
in the previous simulation. The only difference is that I will assume that all investors have
perfect 1-year foresight as to vacancy rate and change discount rates depending on the
prospective vacancy. This assumption is achieved as follows:
P = it + )T- g9(a/ + 'I+]
where pt is the discount rate at the year t, and it, r, g(arO are the same as mentioned in the
previous simulation. I add vt+J that denotes the difference between the actual vacancy rate at the
year t+1 (forecasted vacancy rate at time t) and the average rate of vacancy from 1975 to 1998.
14+ = (actual vacancy rate at time t+1) - (average rate of vacancy)
I assume that the average vacancy rate represents a state of equilibrium of office markets. For
instance, if investors forecast that a vacancy rate a year from today is above the average rate of
vacancy, they will increase their discount rate by adding the difference onto an original discount
rate. This adjustment will have the effect of decreasing today's asset prices.
The intuition of this adjustment is as follows. As seen in chapter three, construction of
office buildings was affected by the amount of funds available to private firms. Thus, this
inefficient system observed in chapter three assumed that construction is driven regardless of
current and future conditions of office markets. On the other hand, investments through the
capital market are considered to be more efficient and forward-looking. When investors think
that prospective vacancy rates are relatively high, they will likely raise the cost of capital. Thus,
I substitute the level of vacancy rate for this increase in the cost of capital in this model.
Another argument can also be made from the irrational behavior of institutional
investors responding to changes in economic factors. Suppose that rents suddenly increase due
to a change in economic fundamentals. Irrational or inefficient institutional investors may
expect that the rents will remain at the present level elevated by the economic change, and that
the rents will not decrease with a future supply of office buildings. Eventually, asset prices will
continue to increase, and much construction will be started. After some periods, however, this
construction will be completed and supplied in office markets. In the end, we will likely have
an oversupply of buildings, followed by a decrease in rents. On the other hand, if we assume
that investors are more rational and efficient, they will predict that construction can take place,
and that prospective rents may decrease in the future. Thus, the volume of construction will be
.3
much smaller than that under the previous irrational expectation.
5.2.2 Data Specification
Variables other than vacancy rates are completely the same. Thus, I will mention the
data of vacancy rates.
Vacancy Rate (v)
I use the vacancy rate of the Tokyo metropolitan area from 1975 to 1998 provided by the
Japan Building Association 4. Since I will assume that all investors can completely forecast
vacancy rate a year hence, the time series will match other variables.
I compute the average of vacancy rates between 1975 and 1998, and assume that the
average vacancy rate (1.54%) stands for a state of equilibrium of the office market. For instance,
the actual vacancy rate in 1975 is 1.70%. Investors forecast this vacancy rate in 1974, and add
the difference (0.16% = 1.70% - 1.54%) onto their discount rates when computing the asset
3 Denise DiPasquale and William C. Wheaton, Urban Economics and Real Estate Markets, 1996, Prentice-Hall.
4 The trend of the vacancy rates can be seen in the figure 3-5.
prices in the year 1974.
5.2.3 Result and Discussion
Figure 5-2 shows the result of the simulation. As a whole, the trend is almost the same
as seen in the previous simulation, but the magnitude of changes is different.
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In the simulation the increase in estimated asset prices after the first oil crisis is
controlled to some extent because of an increase in vacancy rates around 1976. On the other
hand, the oscillation of prices during the bubble economy is promoted. This is due to the
remarkably low rates of vacancy (0.2 %) beginning from the mid 1980s. Unlike in the previous
simulation, the estimated prices hit their highest levels in 1989, not in 1992. The possible
reason is that low vacancy trend had continued until 1990, and then vacancy rates increased,
especially in 1993 (1.8%). This huge increase in vacancy rates is forecasted and incorporated in
1992, resulting in lower prices. The estimated prices around the late 1990s are much lower than
that in the previous simulation. The vacancy rates around the period are almost 5%, which adds
risk premium onto discount rates.
The result implies that the recent actual asset prices might be higher than the estimated
prices, which is valued more based on economic fundamentals. If this is true, the introduction
of J-REITs will inform the market as to true underlying asset prices, which can further lower real
estate asset prices.
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For additional information of this model, I will briefly introduce another simulation in
which investors have a much longer foresight, 5-year foresight as to future vacancy rates.
Figure 5-3 shows the result. Note that time series are shortened because of the longer forecast
of vacancy rates.
The result clearly indicates that long-term oscillation of asset prices is controlled to a
great extent. It is reasonable to suppose that asset price movement will be further leveled when
the supply factor, affected by estimated asset price movement, is taken into account.
5.3 Third Simulation: Different Views on Risk Premium "J-REITs"
So far in this chapter, I have assumed that all investors agree on the risk premium of real
estate investment, and the rate of premium is stable throughout the period. The risk premium in
the previous two simulations is 3.5%, the average rate of risk premium that institutional investors
applied to their pro forma analysis in recent times.
Theoretically, however, risk premiums can be different from time to time, and the rate of
premium demanded by the capital market investors may also be different from that of
institutional investors. Therefore, I will make another simulation in which the risk premium of
J-REIT investors is approximated based on beta (P) of publicly traded real estate firms' stocks.
In fact, empirical evidence shows us that the performance of equity REITs is much more
correlated to the performance of the stock market than to that of direct real estate investment in
the United States. For instance, the correlation of quarterly returns (1978 - 1994) between S&P
500 and equity REITs is 0.6912, whereas the correlation between NCREIF5 and equity REITs is
5 National Council of Real Estate Investment Fiduciaries collects historical data on various institutional-grade
property types, sorted by geographic areas. Index, called Russell-NCREIF Real Estate Performance Report, is often
cited as the benchmark for institutional real estate performance.
0.04236. Furthermore, Quan and Titman (1999) show that the contemporaneous relation
between yearly real estate price changes and stock return is quite high (0.84) and statistically
significant in Japan7 . Thus, it might be reasonable to assume that the profile of prospective
J-REIT investors is close to that of real estate stock investors.
5.3.1 Methodology, Model Specification, and Data Description
The basic methodology, model, and data used in the simulation are the same as those of
the second simulation. The only difference is that I will assume that J-REIT equity investors
value all real estate investments in the market. Investors will change the risk premium from
time to time, depending on actual past performances of their investments. Therefore, the
variable to be changed is only "n" in the previous model specification. In order to calculate the
risk premium of J-REIT investors, I will start with the CAPM formula to compute P of real estate
stock investments at each year:
Rj- Rf5 a + 8(Rm - R) + 3 (1)
where Rj denotes return on assetj, Rf is risk-free rate, a is constant, Rm denotes market portfolio
return, and q is the idiosyncratic risk. In order to avoid the confusion of the symbols in the
previous sections, and to clarify the model, the above equation is refined such that:
Sn-in=a+ A(Mn-in)+en (2)
where Sn denotes the monthly return on the stocks of real estate firms at the month n, Mn denotes
the monthly return on the market portfolio at the month n, and in denotes the monthly risk-free
rate at the month n.
6 William B. Brueggeman and Jeffrey D. Fisher, Real Estate Finance and Investments, 1997, Irwin/McGraw-Hill.
7 Daniel C. Quan and Sheridan Titman, Do Real Estate Prices and Stock Prices Move Together? An International
Analysis, 1999, Real Estate Economics.
I use actual monthly data and run a regression based on equation (2) to estimate Pt (beta
at the year t). For instance, to calculate the P1980 (beta in 1980), I use monthly data on market
portfolio returns, real estate stock returns, and risk-free interest rates from 2/1968 to 12/1980
(155 months time series). To compute P1990 (beta in 1990), I run a regression based on monthly
data from 2/1968 to 12/1990.
I calculate market portfolio monthly returns from the monthly price change of TOPIX.
I use the monthly price change of real estate stock index to estimate monthly real estate stock
returns. Both indices8 are provided by the Tokyo Stock Exchange, with data beginning from
1/4/1968. As a risk-free rate at each month, I use a 10-year government bond yield with the
longest remaining maturity. Since the data are tabulated monthly but expressed by a yearly
yield, I approximate the monthly risk-free rate by taking the twelfth root of the yearly yield at
each month. After calculating Pt by running the regressions, I compute the risk premium at each
year based on a following equation:
(Risk Premium at the year t: I*t) = 0.62 * Pt * {(Average Market Portfolio Returns from 1968
to the year t) - (Average Risk-free Rates from 1968 to the year t)}
I estimated the Pt from the actual past data on stock prices of publicly traded real estate
firms. Since these firms typically employed debt in their capital structure, the estimated Pt is
considered to reflect both financial risks (debt risk) and investment risks. In order to assume
hereafter that J-REITs are 100% equity financed, and to eliminate particular financial risks of
these firms, I multiply the Pt by the market equity ratio of 0.62, the ratio of market value of equity
to the total market value of firm (i.e. I "unlever" their equity Pt to estimate asset 1t)9. The same
8 Unfortunately, both indices do not include dividend yield.
9 To estimate asset beta, the following equation may usually be used: [PA PD *D/(D+E) + PE *E/(D+E)], where PA,
PD, and PE denote asset beta, debt beta, and equity beta, respectively. D denotes market value of debt, and E is
ratio is used throughout the period. The data and method to estimate the ratio are explained in
APPENDIX 4.
I compute the average market portfolio returns by taking the average of past yearly
returns from 1968 to the year t. I calculate the average risk-free rates by taking the average of
10-year government bond yields with the longest remaining maturity, tabulated quarterly, from
the first quarter of 1968 to the fourth quarter of the year t. Both rates are expressed as yearly
yields. Therefore, the discount rate is finalized as follows:
pat = it + 7r - g~a4 + V,+1
where pt is the final discount rate at the year t, it is prevailing (not past average) risk-free interest
rate at the year t, r*, is the risk premium calculated at the year t, g(,,Ot is the rent growth rates as
mentioned in the previous sections, and vt+I is the differences of a forecasted vacancy rate and its
average rate. It is not obvious, however, whether the capital market has already incorporated
future vacancy risks into their risk premiums. Hence, I will assume hereafter that the capital
market originally did not include prospective vacancy risk in their risk premiums. Please also
note that I approximate the risk premiums of commercial real estate investments with the P of the
real estate stock index. However, these real estate firms are not completely pure commercial
real estate players 0 . Thus, the estimated P may be affected by other real estate businesses such
as condominium developments".
market value of equity. If I assume that these firms employ low enough levels of leverage, PD can be seen as almost
zero. Thus, I use the following approximation to estimate asset beta: [pA = PE *E/(D+E)].
'0 Their revenues mainly come from both commercial real estate rents and residential unit sales. Refer to
APPENDIX 3.
" Refer to APPENDIX 5.
5.3.2 Result and Discussion
Figure 5-4 shows the result of the simulation. Due to the high risk-premium based on
the past P analyses of real estate stock investments, the estimated prices are lowered during the
entire period.
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The P of real estate stock investments stayed at quite a high level during the period
(approximately from 1.05 to 1.23)12 as compared to that of the REITs in the United States
(around the 0.5 range' 3). A question arises as to why the P of real estate stock is so high in
Japan. If we assume that the correlation between stock yield and real estate price changes is
strong (Quan and Titman: 1999), and that almost the entire assets of real estate firms are
12 Approximately from 0.65 to 0.76 under the assumption of all equity finance.
" Under the assumption of all equity finance.
composed of real estate, real estate stock prices are more likely related to real estate asset prices.
Thus, one may question the high P because the Japanese believed that real estate was an ultimate
safe harbor, always beating any other assets with ever-increasing prices. It is my view that the
capital market evaluated real estate stocks based on specific asset allocations of these real estate
firms. The capital market would also incorporate the cyclical risks peculiar to the real estate
industry. Since detailed arguments about the issue are not the primary objectives of the thesis, I
will introduce several analyses in APPENDIX 5.
I will further examine the P of real estate stock investments in recent years. As of the
end of the year 1999, the risk premium is 4.56% (P=1.18). To eliminate the effect of historical
data, I also examine the risk premium based on data from a shorter period (1/1997 to 12/1999).
The P goes down from the historical P of 1.18 to 0.90, but the difference between market
portfolio returns and risk-free interest rates increases. As a result, the risk premium becomes
4.70%, slightly higher than that calculated by using a longer period of data. In any case,
estimated risk premiums are more than the premium that institutional investors has been applying
to their pro forma analysis (3.5%).
It is not obvious, as mentioned, whether the estimated risk premiums have already
incorporated future vacancy risks. If we assume that the capital market has not yet included
prospective vacancy risks, we need to forecast these vacancy rates.
The Ikoma Data Service System published in 1999 the forecast of future vacancy rates
by the year 2003. A chart describing the trend of vacancy rates appears on the report' 4 , but real
numbers are not available. Therefore, the vacancy rates I will mention hereafter are my
estimation from the chart. The forecast shows that the vacancy rates of three major
14 Ikoma Data Service System, IDSS Fudousan Hakusho '99.
metropolitan areas (Tokyo, Osaka, and Nagoya) will record the historical highest in the early
2000s. For instance, the vacancy rate of the Osaka area will reach 10% in 2001, and that of the
Tokyo area will reach 7% in 2002. The report argues that the reason will be partly due to the
economic depression. In today's economic environment, private firms are trying to reduce
occupied space or eliminate branches in order to cut down their overheads. The report also
argues that a huge supply of office buildings can be predicted around 2002, and this will further
push up future vacancy rates.
If we add these forecasted vacancy rates onto estimated risk premiums, and if we take
into account the fact that government is planning to increase the official discount rate, it is clear
that we would have significantly low real estate asset prices today.
Overall results would imply that the financial and capital market has continued to
provide low costs of capital to real estate firms relative to the risks. This may also indicate that
the capital market discipline has not worked for real estate stock investments.
The question is whether the capital market will continue this behavior with J-REITs, or
if it will provide high costs of capital and push down asset prices as observed in the simulation.
This issue may be determined by who will be prospective investors of J-REITs. If the profile of
J-REIT investors is different from those of real estate stock investors, the capital market may
raise costs of capital for J-REITs. To work out the issue, I will briefly introduce my
assumptions as to possible differences between J-REIT and real estate stock investors.
In theory, when a firm uses lower discount rates than the stock market expects, the
market can punish the firm by lowering its stock prices and increasing costs of capital for the firm.
This increase in costs of capital will in turn decrease asset prices. However, the result of our
model seems to indicate that the market has not punished real estate firms. Examining the true
reasons must require great amounts of analyses, but a stock sharing system peculiar to Japan, the
so-called mochiai, may be one of the reasons.
Taniguchi (1990)15 argues that the mochiai continued to support high Japanese stock
prices relative to firms' earnings. The mochiai is a mutual stock sharing system between firms
and their main banks'6 . This block shareholding system allows the firm to control the amount of
floating stock. Using empirical data from 1979 to 1988, Taniguchi analyzes how stock prices
were artificially maintained by this mochiai mechanism. The analysis shows that overall P/E
ratio (price earning ratio: price of a stock divided by its earnings per share) of the Japanese stocks
would go down by approximately 5-10%, when the effect derived from the mochiai is
eliminated1 7. Thus, it is possible that the mochiai is one of the reasons why the capital market
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was not able to punish real estate firms by lowering their stock prices
Under the above assumption, we may be able to think that prospective J-REIT investors
may be different from current and past real estate stock investors. Since the legislation of
J-REITs is underway, we do not yet know what the regulations will be. Nonetheless, as is the
15 Tomohiko Taniguchi, Japan's Banks and the "Bubble Economy" of the Late 1980s, 1993, Center of International
Studies, Program on U.S.-Japan Relations, Princeton University.
16 This system can be well observed in keiretsu groups. Please refer to section 3.1.2.
17 Several assumptions about the financial and real estate markets during the bubble economy can also be made from
this mochiai system standpoint. During the bubble economy, large firms made most of the bullish stock markets.
They could obtain cheap cost of capital by issuing new stocks. Theoretically, the announcement of a new stock
issue will likely decrease the stock price of a firm due to the information asymmetry. However, new stock issues
did not decrease stock prices in Japan partly due to the mochiai system, in which the information asymmetry is
mitigated. These low costs of capital are considered to have flowed into the stock and real estate markets, pushing
up both asset prices. Owing to both increased asset prices, firms could also employ more debt, since land and stock
collateral financing was popular in the Japanese credit system. These debts again flowed into the stock and real
estate markets, further pushing up these asset prices.
18 Another possible assumption is that the financial market continued to provide the real estate firms with low costs
of debt capital.
case in the United States, the limitation of large block shareholdings is forecasted 9. Income
distribution requirements of J-REITs (at least 90% of taxable income must be distributed to
shareholders as a dividend) will keep investors from expecting a high growth opportunity in
J-REITs. As a consequence, investors will price J-REITs mainly based on their regular
dividends. Under this mechanism, the capital market discipline might work.
5.3.3 Conclusions
The third simulation has many implications. First, it seems that the inefficient financial
market has continued to provide low costs of debt capital to direct real estate investors. If
financial institutions had noticed the actual risk profile of direct real estate investments, the cost
of capital would have been increased, which in turn would have lowered asset prices. Second,
the same argument can also be made with the capital market. The lower discount rates that the
real estate firms have used, or are currently using, might indicate that the capital market also has
continued to provide low costs of equity capital to real estate firms. These stances of the
financial and capital markets have continued to contribute to the discrepancy between real estate
asset prices and the economic fundamentals, followed by cyclical oversupply of office buildings.
In this sense, the huge supply of office buildings forecasted for 2002 may be due to low discount
rates that institutional investors have recently been using. We have already looked at the
possible result of this effect in the form of increasing vacancy rates which appears on Ikoma's
report.
I also argued that the emergence of J-REITs might lower real estate asset prices. Under
the assumption that J-REIT investors are more efficient than are real estate stock investors, risk
19 Nihon Fudousan Counselor Kai, Fudousan Shoukenka no Jitsumu, 1999, Seibun-sha.
premiums of J-REIT investors can be much higher than that of past and current stock investors20.
Moreover, if J-REIT investors include increasing vacancy rates as an additional risk premium, the
asset prices can be further depressed.
Basically, the arguments in this section were based solely on short-term forecasts of
equity capital costs. From this point of view, we found several factors that may increase the
rates used to discount commercial real estate cash flows. However, from other points of view,
or from a much longer perspective, there will be several aspects that may decrease discount rates,
or increase real estate prices. First, J-REITs will be tax-exempt investment vehicles.
Theoretically, asset prices must be pushed up by the present value of the tax shield effects. This
effect can exceed, or at least mitigate, the negative impacts of the increase in equity capital costs.
Second, I assumed that J-REITs are 100% equity financed. However, cheap debt capitals may
continue to flow into J-REITs, as it actually has into private firms. Third, the efficient capital
market will choke off over-development tendencies. As seen in the second simulation, efficient
investors are much more likely to notice the prospective change in economic factors, and tend to
adjust the relative cost of capital. This capital market discipline can help keep space markets in
equilibrium. Thus, in the longer-run, risk premium for over-development might be reduced by
the emergence of J-REITs.
In the end, what we really need to know is that past and current costs of capital for real
estate investments have not reflected the real risk. J-REITs are expected to help change this
mind-set of the financial and real estate markets. The successful introduction of J-REITs may
control the over-development tendency and improve social welfare.
20 I am assuming that J-REITs are all equity financed.
6 Summary
In chapter two, I began the discussion with the history of real estate ownership. Private
firms continued to acquire land after World War II. They also invested in land even when they
did not have any plan for utilizing it. In the later part of the chapter, I presented several reasons
why firms increased land acquisition. The primary reason is that private firms needed to build
business facilities to meet the strong demand for goods and services during the high economic
growth period. I also proposed other rationales including the quasi-rent value of collateral
service for private firms. However, these reasons cannot completely explain why land prices
and the supply of commercial space were volatile, and why the firms continued to acquire land
without plans for immediate business use.
In chapter three, I argued that finance matters in the real estate market. Government
and private industry established a credit and financial system in order to catch up with the
economies of other developed countries. To obtain debt financing during cyclical depressions,
they devised a credit system that based on land collateral. It may also be assumed that
government was to some extent concerned with supporting this credit system by participating in
the asset market.
Later in chapter three, the land price determination model and construction
determination model were proposed and examined. The result of these regression models
showed the close relationship between finance conditions and the real estate market. This
implied that the amount of funds available to private firms could be one of the most important
determinants of real estate investment. Then, I proposed that the credit system based on land
collateral provided private firms with lower costs of capital relative to the risk, and that these
funds flowed into the stock and real estate markets, creating booms and busts in the asset markets,
especially in the late 1980s and throughout the 1990s.
In chapter four, I presented key factors to establish an alternative model of the real estate
market. The credit system based on land collateral needs to be changed to establish an efficient
financial market. An inefficient interaction between the asset market and the property market
due to the high degree of legal protection for tenant generated many problems in the entire
economy. The tenancy law might misdirect space allocation, and may be one of the reasons
why rents are high in the metropolitan areas.
Several issues related to real estate investors were also argued in the chapter. Private
firms with good land collateral are the dominant real estate investors. However, they are likely
to have agency problems such as trend chasing and herding behavior. Asset diversification
policy at the firm level may reduce the values of firms. We also learned that pension funds are
the most suitable investors from the asset-liability point of view. Later in the chapter, I
suggested prospective functions of J-REITs.
In chapter five, I made three simulations under the alternative model of the financial and
real estate markets. Estimated asset prices in these three scenarios move differently from actual
price movements. Several forecasts and related problems were also proposed at the end of the
chapter. Among others, the financial and capital markets seem to continue to provide
institutional investors with lower costs of capital relative to the risk. If this behavior continues,
it may take time for the Japanese real estate market to regain a state of equilibrium.
As discussed throughout the thesis, the relationship between the financial market and the
real estate market is strong and important. It would not be an exaggeration to say that the
amount and the relative cost of capital have a great impact on a nation's real estate market.
This "cost of capital" argument will also be applied to the world economy framework.
Japanese firms acquired relatively lower costs of capital from the late 1980s to the early 1990s
mainly due to the inflated stock and land collateral values, and the sudden appreciation of yen.
These funds flowed not only into their own markets, but also into foreign markets, especially into
the real estate market in the United States. The idea of buying out assets in distressed markets
with lower costs of capital seems to make sense. Japanese private firms, however, had not yet
become accustomed to overseas investments. Foreign markets operate much differently than
their own markets. Local players have distinct advantages in terms of market information, the
legal system, and so forth.
In today's world economy, Japan is providing some countries with capital at an
extremely low cost. These countries might be taking advantage of the low costs for their own
economies. In this sense, the world economy might be the most inefficient market. In order to
improve efficiency in the world economy, to avoid the misdirection of funds, and to help these
countries avoid relying on continuous fund inflows from other countries, we need to start making
our own markets as transparent as possible. The transparency will help make the nation's
markets efficient, which eventually will improve efficiency in all the markets of the world.
We learned that finance does matter in the real estate market, since the markets is not
perfect and efficient. Thus, the neoclassical economics model does not work in the real world
context. Nevertheless, it is a good idea to start from the model. The intuitions of the
Modigliani & Miller Theorem will help us understand where market inefficiencies exist, what
they are, and how much we are paying for them. After answering these questions, we will be
able to decide which costs should be eliminated, although it can be argued some of these costs
may be inevitable or necessary in the real world, especially to build another "Tower of Babel."
APPENDIX 1: Movement of Each Variable in the Regression Analysis (Ch. 3)
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APPENDIX 2: Project Lists

















































































































































































































































































































































































































APPENDIX 3: Overview of Real Estate Investors
1. Developer
One of the largest professional real estate investors in the Japanese market have been real
estate developers. Unlike their counterparts in the United States, Japanese developers typically
own office buildings, shopping centers, retail malls, and hotels after finishing developments.
Since they did not dispose and recapitalize their assets, their capacities to develop were limited
due to finance constraints. It is assumed that this is one of the reasons why private firms had to
acquire land and build business facilities on their own during the high economic growth period.
On the other hand, this developers' structure promoted excessive investments during the bubble
economy because they were the largest real estate investors with class-A collateral land. In this
sense, real estate developers may not be efficient real estate investment vehicles in that they
increased and decreased developments regardless of the demand for space.
In order to look at the characteristics of developers, I examine how much they depend
their revenues on rent incomes from commercial real estate. I divide the total sales amount of
major three developers by business categories: commercial real estate (rent revenues), residential
sales revenues, and other in table 1. This table shows that Japanese developers earn a large
portion of their revenues from rent incomes from commercial real estate.
Table 1 Breakdown of the Three Major Developers' Sales
(million yen)
Mitsui Mitsubishi Sumitomo
Commercial 243,737 42.5% 239,988 66.0% 128,686 45.2%
Residential 296,681 51.7% 86,994 23.9% 135,998 47.7%
Other 33,602 5.9% 36,750 10.1% 20,325 7.1%
Total Sales 574,020 100.0% 363,732 100.0% 285,009 100.0%
Source: 1998 Fiscal Year Financial Reports
If the specialization advantage exists as discussed in chapter four, and if the emergence of more
efficient investment vehicles like J-REITs is taken for granted, the revenue structure of Japanese
developers may need to change in the future.
2. Life Insurance Company
Life insurance companies are major office building owners in the current Japanese real
estate market. While real estate developers struggled with obtaining enough funds to finance
office-building projects, life insurance companies had increased office-building investments since
1970s until the burst of the bubble economy. Asset-liability matching issue seems to accelerate
their direct investments in office buildings. A life insurance company's decision to allocate
most of its funds to long-term investments is a result of the nature of its liabilities. As most
contracts written by life insurance companies are based on some contractually fixed interest that
will be paid to a policyholder after an extended number of years, long-term investment is a
natural consequence for an insurance company to use to hedge its commitment.
Historically, life insurers enjoyed good performance in managing their funds due to a
vast, perennial supply of unrealized profits from their long-held portfolios of stocks and real
estate. The paper profits of life insurers have been substantially eroded by low interest rates,
however, as well as the scourge of non-performing assets and lackluster stock and real estate
markets. Under these conditions, life insurers are recently trying to recapitalize their real estate
assets1 , but little progress has been made because of the lack of private equity capital in the
market.
* For instance, Touhou Life Insurance sold its head office building to overseas investors to restructure its portfolio.
Nihon Keizai Shinbun, March, 11, 1999.
3. Pension Fund2
(1) Structure and Scale
Pensions in Japan basically fall into one of two categories: public pensions and corporate
pensions. A market for private pension plans exists, but is not large enough to examine its
influence on the real estate market in this thesis. Public pension schemes are broadly classified
into three: the Mutual Aid Pension, Employee Pension Insurance, and the National Pension
(Figure 1). The Mutual Aid Pension scheme, with assets of 44 trillion yen, covers public
servants. Employee Pension Insurance, with assets of 130 trillion yen, covers salaried corporate
employees. The National Pension plan, a basic program with assets of 9 trillion yen, is
mandatory for all Japanese citizens over 20 years of age.
Figure 1 Japanese Pension Fund Scheme (scale: trillion yen)
Employee's Tax-qualified
Pension Finds Pension Finds
(47) (19)
National





Self Employer and Others Salaried Corporate Employee Public Servants
Source: Nenkin Hakusho, 1999, Shakai Hoken Kenkyu-jo
2 Source: Nikkei Net Interactive (www.nni.nikkei.co.jp/).
Employee Pension Insurance's fund initially came fully under control of the Ministry of
Finance, which delegated asset-management duties to its Trust Fund Bureau. In 1988, however,
the Trust Fund Bureau began consigning fund assets to the Pension Welfare Service Public Corp.,
which in turn assigned management of those assets to the private sector, namely trust banks, life
insurance companies and investment-advisory firms. As of March 31, 1998, assets under
management totaled more than 24 trillion yen, but the effective returns have been pitiful. The
reason for this is the high guaranteed interest rate paid by the Pension Welfare Service Public
Corp. to the Trust Fund Bureau. In fact, the government had put the Employee Pension program
in the position of borrowing money at high interest rate to invest in stocks and bonds,
presupposing a rising market that would yield a profit on the interest rate spread. Instead, when
portfolio returns evaporated after the burst of the bubble economy, a huge negative spread
appeared. Investment losses amounted to 1.4 trillion yen as of the end of fiscal 1997; they are
scheduled to be amortized by fiscal 2000.
The Ministry of Health and Welfare, meanwhile, plans to establish a new "pension
asset-management organization" that will continue to invest some Employee Pension assets in the
financial markets. The real estate sector is paying attention to this fund.
(2) Corporate Pension Schemes
Employees' pension funds (kousei nenkin kikin) and tax-qualified pension funds (zeisei
tekikaku nenkin) - Japan's two main corporate pension schemes -- are another targets of the real
estate sector. Under the employees' pension fund system, companies place into a corporate
pension reserve additional contributions beyond their mandatory payments into
government-managed Employee Pension Insurance, and manage those assets to meet or surpass
an assumed rate of return calculated to cover projected benefit obligations. Because these funds
are closely linked to the public pension system, the Ministry of Health and Welfare monitors
accounting, investment and related systems. Companies, which set up tax-qualified pension
plans, manage fund assets independently from public pension schemes. These funds fall under
the watchful eye of the National Tax Administration Agency. Differences in asset-management
systems highlight the operation of these two corporate pension schemes. A key difference is
that assets in employees' pension funds have, since the end of fiscal 1997, been assessed at
market value, whereas assets in tax-qualified pension plans are assessed at book value.
i) Employees' Pension Funds
There were 1,850 separate employees' pension funds as of April 1, 1999, with assets
amounting to 46.7 trillion yen as of March 31. These figures represent the total number of funds
established by parent-only or group businesses as well as collective funds established by groups
of small companies or other organizations operating within a single industry. Typical examples
are the employees' pension fund of Hitachi Ltd., and the Zenkoku (All Japan) Credit Union
employees' pension fund
ii) Tax-Qualified Pension Plans
Tax-qualified pension plans are not funds per se. A company can establish a pension
program and assign management of the assets to a trust bank or life insurance company for
investment purposes to generate source funds for lump-sum severance payments to employees
upon resignation or for annuities.
From a taxation viewpoint, tax-qualified pension plans have several disadvantages
compared with employees' pension funds, and are thus favored more by small and midsize
businesses than by large companies. However, regulations governing plan formation are less
rigorous for tax-qualified pension plans, a factor that has encouraged companies like IBM Japan
Ltd. to adopt this scheme. Total asset scale reached an estimated 18.5 trillion yen, about half
that of employees' pension funds, as of March-end 1998.
iii) Pension Fund Association
The Pension Fund Association is a special organization that manages the pension assets
of individuals who have withdrawn from employees' pension programs (typically due to a job
change) before retirement age. With assets of more than 3.2 trillion yen, the PFA is in effect the
largest pension fund in Japan. It makes use of the services of as many as 21
investment-advisory firms and is Japan's most aggressive participant in the execution of in-house
as well as consultancy-oriented portfolio management activity.
APPENDIX 4: Data and Methodology to Estimate Market Equity Ratio
I estimate the market equity ratio (0.62) based on following method and data.
First, from the real estate firms whose stock prices are reflected in the real estate stock
index, I select eight real estate firms' whose main businesses are considered to be commercial
2
real estate2
Next, I calculate each firm's market values of both equity and debt. The market value
of equity is computed by multiplying the number of shares by the highest market stock price from
January 4 to June 30, 2000. The market value of debt is obtained from the company financial
information of the Yahoo Japan3. I use the total amount of "interest-bearing debt" of each firm
as the market value of debt of the firm. The market equity ratio of each firm is computed based
on the following equation.
Market Equity Ratio = Market Equity Value / (Market Equity Value + Market Debt Value)
I take the average of the market equity ratios of these firms. Thus, the final ratio used in the
third simulation in chapter five is 0.624.
The firms include Airport Facilities (74%), Daibiru (93%), Heiwa Real Estate (56%), Mitsubishi Estate (65%),
Sankei Building (91%), TOC (73%), Toho Real Estate (54%), and Tokyo Rakutenchi (69%). The parentheses
indicate the percentages of rent revenues from commercial real estate to the total revenues of these firms.
2 I select these firms whose revenues from commercial real estate exceed 50% of the total revenues of the firms.
3 http://profile.yahoo.co.jp/
4 Since the market equity ratio changed every year, it must be better to change the ratio based on historical financial
information of these firms. Unfortunately, I was not able to obtain these data mainly due to time constraint.
APPENDIX 5: Risk Premium of Real Estate Stock Investments
I will try to understand why the P of Japanese real estate stock exceeds 1.0. I will
mainly focus on comparing relative risks between market portfolio investment and real estate
investment, assuming that aggregate stock price indices (i.e. TOPIX and Nomura-Russell Stock
Performance Index) represent the performance of the market portfolio investment. Note,
however, that perfectly analyzing relative risks of both investments is not straightforward mainly
because of data constraints.
I begin from calculating standard deviations of semiannual price changes of both
aggregate stock price (TOPIX) and land prices' (Land Price Index used in chapter three) from
1980 to 1998. The standard deviation of stock price change is 0.142, whereas that of land price
change is 0.075. Only from this result, it seems that land is a safer asset than the market
portfolio. Although this result is consistent with the belief of the Japanese that land is the safest
asset class in Japan, it can be misleading mainly because of following two reasons.
First, both data do not include income return, i.e. dividend yield for stocks and rent yield
for land. Including income returns may change risk-return characteristics of both assets.
Second, the TOPIX is a value-weighted index of the first section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange,
and it is calculated based on actual market stock prices. On the other hand, land price index is
computed based on appraisal. Appraisers typically refer to past trends in determining current
land prices, which tends to create lags behind actual market prices. Thus, it is reasonable to
consider that land price fluctuations are more or less smoothed out, which is likely to lower the
standard deviation.
The land price index is computed based on average land prices of six major urban cities, and includes residential,
commercial, and industrial zoning areas.
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Therefore, I will try to include income returns of both investments in the next analysis2.
I use the Nomura-Russell Stock Performance Index as an index of the market portfolio. The
data include dividend yields. As an index of real estate investment performance, I use the
MTB-IKOMA Real Estate Investment Index. I use the total return index that includes return
from office rents.
The result is shown in the below table.
Nomura-Russell MTB-IKOMA MTB-IKOMA MTB-IKOMA
Stock Index Aoyama Tokyo-Metropolitan All Japan
Standard Deviation 0.21 0.22 0.18 0.16
Mean Return 7.71% 5.53% 4.00% 3.97%
I categorize MTB-IKOMA index by area sizes, small, medium, and large. Aoyama is
one of the business districts in the Tokyo metropolitan area. Tokyo-Metropolitan includes such
prefectures as Tokyo, Kanagawa, Chiba, and Saitama. As easily predicted from the portfolio
theory point of view, the standard deviation and mean return decrease as real estate asset pools
are diversified.
The standard deviations of market portfolio, represented by the Nomura-Russell, and
real estate investments become much higher than these we saw in the simple price change
analysis. In particular, the standard deviation of the "Aoyama" exceeds that of the
Nomura-Russell. However, the overall risk of the market portfolio seems higher than the
overall risk of real estate investments (MTB-IKOMA All Japan). Thus, the result cannot yet
answer to our question as to why the P of Japanese real estate stock exceeds 1.0.
2 Unfortunately, all real estate performance indices depend on appraisal in computing asset prices. Therefore, I
cannot eliminate this factor in the thesis.
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From these two simple analyses, I will propose several points with regard to this issue.
First, the capital market seems to have priced real estate stocks based on particular asset
allocations of real estate firms. In the above table, we found that only the standard deviation of
the "MTB-IKOMA Aoyama" exceeds that of Nomura-Russell Index. Japanese real estate firms
in the first section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange tend to hold real estate assets after developments,
and these assets are concentrated in some particular large cities. This implies that their
investment performances are much closer to the "MTB-IKOMA Aoyama" than to
"MTB-IKOMA All Japan".
Second, it may also be assumed that real estate stock price indicates more accurately the
true underlying prices of assets held by these real estate firms. As will be mentioned later, the
MTB-IKOMA Index is computed based on appraisal. Thus, the movements of the index may be
smoothed out. On the other hand, the capital market is more likely to concern about the market
values of real estate assets of these companies, not the appraisal values.
From this point of view, it is important to note that the real estate stock index may not
completely measure the market values of a particular real estate asset type, i.e. commercial,
residential, industrial, etc. For instance, typically real estate firms earn sales and profits mainly
from both commercial real estate rents and sales of residential (condominium) units. The stock
prices of these firms seem to be affected by the performances of these two businesses.
Figure 1, 2, and 3 show the movements of the real estate stock index, the condominium
sales rate, and commercial real estate return from 1992 to 1998, respectively.
3 Refer to the APPENDIX 3 (1. Developer).
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Figure 1: Real Estate Stock Index
Source: Tokyo Stock Exchange [yearly average]







Source: Fudousan Keizai Kenkyujo [yearly average: the number of units sold / the number of units supplied]







Source: MTB-IKOMA Real Estate Investment Index
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These figures clearly show that stock prices of real estate firms are not determined by
either residential sales performances or office building performances. Rather, it seems that
combined factors had an impact on the real estate stock prices. Therefore, to approximate the
price of a specific type of real estate assets with the real estate stock prices may be misleading.
Lastly, among others, to exactly compare the overall risk of both investments is not an
easy task due to the data constraint. The price index of the TOPIX covers longest time series
(from 1949), but the total return index that includes dividend yield started from 1990. Although
the Nikkei Stock Index is another well-known stock index, it does not include dividend yield.
As to real estate index, there are several investment performance indices. Most famous real
estate investment indices would be MTB-IKOMA and STIX (Sumitomo Trust Property Index).
However, like other indices, both calculate asset prices based on appraisal. Moreover, rent
incomes are computed based on market rents. As I already mentioned, the existing rents can be
different from the prevailing market rents. Thus, rent incomes of these indices do not reflect the
real rent inflows from office building investments. In addition, like the STIX, some indices
cover data of smaller area sizes. These indices are considered to be inappropriate for the
apple-to-apple comparison of overall performances4.
4 Relatively high level of debt the real estate firms typically employ can be one of the reasons why the beta of real
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